Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU
Counter-radicalisation Strategy

17 November 2008
Deliverable 7
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Part I

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Why do young men...

"Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier".¹

The post-mortem video-statement from the alleged “ring-leader” of the London 7/7 bombers, Mohammad Siddique Khan, which was shown on Al Jazeera on 1 September 2005, leaves no doubt that he believed that he was “a soldier” at “war” with the West. A West, which in his mind was threatening his so-called Muslim brothers and sisters, that is the Ummah – the community of Muslim believers all over the world – and that this threat was so severe, that he had to act in defence of it by killing what he saw as supporters of a democratically elected government, which was responsible for the so-called war against his fellow Muslims. And there can be little doubt that he thought that being at war made it legitimate to kill and wound people, who accidentally happened to take the wrong car in the London Underground that July morning in 2005.

But why did Khan, who is remembered as a “quiet, studious” boy at school who was “never in trouble”, commit such a horrible act? A man, who as an adult was employed as a learning mentor at a local primary school and was respected for his commitment to the children of his youth club. (Whitlock, 2005) Why did he and his fellow bombers, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay, all second generation British nationals, seemingly well integrated and normal British youths, decide to become, what Khan describes as “soldiers” and give up their own lives and altogether kill 56 and wound over 700 people on that morning in July?

Indeed, why do some young European men of Muslim faith, who have lived all of their life in democratic societies, choose to give up their seemingly well-integrated, normal lives in order to follow the call for Jihad? And what happens in that process – or those processes – where a person develops more and more radical views, some times ending in violent radicalisation and extremism. And just as intriguing: what can Europe do in order to prevent or manage the problem?

Questions such as these have been at the forefront of the European public debate since the events of ‘9/11’. After the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 attention has been focused on so-called “home-grown” terrorism – that is, terrorist acts committed by perpetrators, who for the most part were born and raised in the very countries they attacked.

The process of radicalisation is here viewed as a complex interaction of factors that does not necessarily lead to violence. Since the process can evolve in many different directions, including non-violent ones, radicals can engage in non-violent behaviour without terrorist intent yet still be considered radical. As such, although not every radical becomes a terrorist, every terrorist has gone through a radicalisation process. This indicates that terrorism is the worst possible outcome of the radicalisation process.

It should be stressed that current knowledge about radicalisation processes is limited. Despite the extensive amount of literature on the causes and consequences of radicalisation, fundamental knowledge about who radicals are and, more importantly, why they commit to extreme and often violent ideologies remains lacking. Even more so, preceding research has demonstrated that radicals, let alone those who engage in terrorism, do not match a specified demographic or psychological profile. Not only do they stem from different age categories, socio-economic strata, and cultural backgrounds (e.g., Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006), they are generally not characterised by psychological peculiarities or deviating personality types (e.g., Victoroff, 2005). Still, even if radicalisation processes are complex and unique, just as the causes for radicalisation are, there are certain similarities, which will be highlighted in part I of this deliverable.
The same lack of solid knowledge is apparent when it comes to European de-radicalisation or counterterrorism efforts, which seek to dissuade radicals from becoming violent and youth from becoming radicals.

As part of their counterterrorism efforts, the UK has intensively focused on relations with the Muslim community. Realizing the need to reach out to moderate Muslims in order to counter extremism and diminish support for terrorists, the Home Office has strived to achieve its strategic objectives by working closely with partners both at the national and international levels. Part of a long-term strategy to protect the public, counter terrorism and counter radicalisation efforts are of great priority.

In the Netherlands, radicalism is considered to be a broad social issue and a considerable risk that poses a threat to the stability of for example the Amsterdam community. As such it is seen as something which can lead to societal unrest and increasing polarization. Analysing the Wij Amsterdammers action plan aimed at halting the emergence of Islamist radicalisation, we describe concrete actions that are being taken in the city of Amsterdam.

Although the primary responsibility for combating terrorism lies with the individual EU Member States, over the last decade, the EU has developed a number of important legislative measures and policies to ensure the safety of its civilians and protect the fundamental democratic values of the Union. One important step was the development of a comprehensive strategy to tackle the terrorist threat. In 2005 the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was introduced, constituting a framework for a broad and proportionate response to combat terrorism at the international, European and national level.

1.2. Overview

In part I of this deliverable, we first present a short overview of the research field of radicalisation. Second, we present and discuss various causal factors and catalysts and how they affect the process of radicalisation. Third, we will discuss to what extent vulnerable groups in society are exposed to and affected by the relevant causal factors. At the end of part I, we present an overview of five case studies involving violent radicalisation in Europe after 9/11.

Part II sets out to map the measures taken to prevent radicalisation and recruitment at the EU level. Relevant policy papers are analyzed to gain a better understanding of the
EU strategies to tackle this phenomenon. Aiming to provide further insight into how the contributing factors of radicalisation are addressed by the EU counter-radicalisation and recruitment strategy, a model is developed to illustrate the degree of overlap between EU policies and the most prominent causal factors of radicalisation. Finally, the specific measures to counter radicalisation taken in the UK and the Netherlands are used as examples of how EU Member States are dealing with the issue at the national and local levels.
2. CAUSAL FACTORS OF RADICALISATION

The first general assumptions on the phenomenon of radicalisation leading to modern-day terrorism date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Radicalisation among European Muslims has been the subject of study since the 1990s. Attention to this particular phenomenon has increased dramatically after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Interest in radicalisation among Muslims in Europe and the phenomenon of home-grown Islamist terrorism received a boost by the Madrid bombings in 2004 and other incidents and arrests in, among others, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Denmark. However, the urge to understand and tackle the threat of radicalisation is not only rooted in fear of possible terrorist attacks. Radicalisation of minority groups poses a serious threat to society and intercultural relations, even when, as in most cases, it does not lead to terrorism. As the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) notes in a report on radicalisation and Salafism: "There is no threat of violence here, nor of an imminent assault upon the Dutch or Western democratic order, but this is a slow process which could gradually harm social cohesion and solidarity and undermine certain fundamental human rights" (AIVD, 2007: 9). The development of extreme attitudes and behaviours in minority groups can enhance impermeability of group boundaries and exert strong influence on groups’ social position in society, resulting in polarisation and intercultural tensions. For example, after Dutch right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn was killed in May 2002 by someone belonging to a radical left-wing subculture, right-wing groups and individuals became increasingly offensive against Muslim communities, even though the murder was not at all inspired by Islam. The incident heated up the debate about multiculturalism in the Netherlands and increased intercultural tensions between Muslims and other cultural groups.

The question arises what the causes of radicalisation are and, subsequently, which social groups are most susceptible to radicalisation. In past and present studies, factors or conditions that are frequently mentioned as causes of radicalisation (in general) include relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), Western occupations and support for oppressive regimes (e.g., Pape, 2006), identity politics (Choudhury, 2007), poor political and socio-economic integration (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006), feelings of humiliation (Stern 1999, 2003;
Juergensmeyer, 2000; Richardson, 2006), and other psychological mechanisms (for an overview, see Victoroff, 2005). Although all of these factors contribute to radicalisation, none suffices in itself as an explanation for the drastic change in attitudes and behaviours of well-integrated individuals like Theo van Gogh’s murderer.

The present deliverable aims to explain this confusing phenomenon by providing insight in the causal factors of radicalisation and the complex interactions by which they lead to radicalisation and radical behaviour. In doing so, the line of reasoning rests on a few essential assumptions.

First and foremost, radicalisation is seen as a collective phenomenon – a process of socialisation – which is the result of individual behaviour. This is also referred to as *methodological individualism* (e.g., Boudon, 1981 & Coleman, 1990). It implies that radicalisation of collective entities can only be explained if we understand how individual behaviour emerges.

Secondly, there is no single explanation for radicalisation. The causes of radicalisation are as diverse as they are abundant (for overviews, see Hudson, 1999; Borum, 2004\(^1\), 2004\(^2\); Nesser, 2004; Bjorgo, 2005; Victoroff, 2005; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Loza, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; EU-Commission Expert Group, 2008). This implies that independent factors are insufficient to result in radicalisation and that radicalisation can only be the outcome of a complex interaction between factors.

Thirdly, causal factors differ in the extent to which they contribute to radicalisation. More explicitly, we argue that external factors like political, economic and cultural conditions indeed shape and constrain the individual’s environment but that they do not have a direct effect on individual behaviour. At the social and individual level, dynamics in which the individual is directly involved need to be started in order for external factors to lead to radicalisation. In addition to these three measurement levels, causal factors are further distinguished into *causes* that set the foundation for radicalisation, and *catalysts* that abruptly accelerate the radicalisation process. Based on the literature on radicalisation, these causes and catalysts can be additionally subdivided into a number of more specific types that are explained and analysed in the coming paragraphs. Together with the three measurement levels (external, social and individual, which are described in par. 4), these causes and catalysts define the
parameters of a simple model with which we study the different dimensions and aspects of radicalisation (see figure 1).

Fig. 1: Categorisation of causal factors of radicalisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Types of causes</th>
<th>Types of catalysts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External level</strong></td>
<td>- Political</td>
<td>- Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic</td>
<td>- Trigger Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social level</strong></td>
<td>- Social identification</td>
<td>- Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Network dynamics</td>
<td>- Trigger Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Relative deprivation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
<td>- Psychological</td>
<td>- Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>characteristics</td>
<td>- Trigger Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Personal experiences</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rationality</td>
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</tbody>
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The central question in this deliverable is how these levels and types of causes and catalysts relate to each other and how they, when combined, result in radicalisation. The main premise is that, in general, radicals are ‘ordinary’ people: they are not insane psychopaths suffering from mental illnesses (Post, 1998; Reich, 1998; Silke, 1998; Crenshaw, 2000). Although most factors are assumed to contribute to all forms of radicalisation, the present study applies the theoretical framework to cases of Islamic radicalism in post 9/11 Europe, due to the present importance to society of understanding this type of radicalisation. Additionally, with the aim of identifying the most vulnerable segments of society, a closer look will be taken at the way in which members of particular groups are exposed to and affected by the relevant causal factors. First, however, we need to take a closer look at the key concepts involved.

3. **RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT**

Although radicalisation and recruitment are increasingly the subjects of scientific studies, no universally accepted definition of either concept has been developed yet. A frequently used definition is the one made by the Dutch intelligence services AIVD: “The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may
constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).” Supplemented by: “a person's (growing) willingness to pursue and/or support such changes himself (in an undemocratic way or otherwise), or his encouraging others to do so” (AIVD, 2004, pp. 13-14). Or phrased a bit shorter, as it is done by the Danish intelligence services: “Radicalization can be described as a process, by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective”. (PET, p. 1) Essentially, violent radicalisation is a socialisation process, which leads to extremism and possibly terrorism.

However, since we in part II of this deliverable mainly deal with EU’s response to radicalisation in order to assess whether policies are thought to have a de-radicalisation effect, it is fairer to use the EU definition of radicalisation. Thus, faced by pressure to tackle radicalisation EU policy makers have developed a few definitions. In particular, the European Commission came up with a clear and frequently applied definition of violent radicalisation, which will be followed in the present study and which will function as a starting point to define recruitment.

Accordingly, violent radicalisation is defined as follows: “The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (EC, 2006). Radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end-state. Rather, radicalisation is an individual development that is initiated by a unique combination of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.

Hence, the EC’s definition accounts for radicalisation’s most prominent feature: it is thoroughly distinct from terrorism². Radicals might subscribe to an ideology that is oriented at generating political and physical distance between their own social group and others without engaging in violence, whereas terrorism is perceived as a political tool. Or, as Robert Pape, one of the most influential scholars of suicide terrorism, states: “terrorists are simply the members of their societies who are the most optimistic about the usefulness of violence for achieving goals that many, and often most, support” (2006: 8). Hence, terrorism is a political tool and as such comprises a conscious act of

² In defining terrorism the present study follows the Council of the European Union, who refers to terrorism as international acts that were committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.
the people involved, whereas radicalisation is a process of socialisation, which people go through that could, ultimately but not necessarily, bring them to acts of terrorism.

Although the present deliverable primarily focuses on describing the most essential causal factors of radicalisation, it is important to note that terrorism is not the only and inevitable result of radicalisation processes. Rather, terrorism is one of the worst possible, but nevertheless not unavoidable, outcomes of radicalisation. In other words, although every terrorist is a radical, not every radical is a terrorist. This implies that radicalisation processes can evolve in many directions, including non-violent ones. Radicals can engage in non-violent behaviour without terrorist intent that can nevertheless be perceived as radical. For example, radicalisation can prompt people to become committed to extreme dawa- or missionary practices or intense religious devotion. In some cases, these acts forebode terrorist engagement. In others, they do not.

As our interest lies in violent radicalisation that poses a threat to European societies, radicalisation as defined by the European Commission accounts for every act or behaviour that can inspire people to engage in terrorist activity. The generation or distribution of radical material for others to radicalise by, as well as incitement of jihad and recruitment for radical organisations all behold acts that have the potential to lead to terrorism and are therefore accounted for by this definition.

In fact, in 2005, alleged members of the Dutch Hofstad Group were convicted for mere possession and distribution of radical documents. At the time, the court judged that the network members incited for jihad with terrorist intent, indicating that the Dutch legal system perceived these acts as potential forebode of terrorist engagement.

In January 2008, however, the Dutch Court of Appeal overturned a number of the convictions of the Hofstad Group members. Prominently, although the Court of Appeal concluded that the alleged network members embraced and incited radical attitudes and ideologies, it stated that it could not be proven that the Hofstad Group was a terrorist organisation and that these acts would inevitably result in terrorist engagement (Jensma, 2008). The court did consider the suspects radical, however. Accordingly, the EC’s definition of violent radicalisation is all-inclusive in the sense that it includes every behaviour or ideological expression that potentially results in terrorism, including incitement,

3 Also Said Mansour in Denmark was in 2007 convicted for incitement of terror through distribution of books, leaflets, cds and dvds on Jihad and of condoning others to hold radical views.
distribution of radical material, recruitment, and condoning others to hold radical views. Even when these generally non-violent acts do not lead to terrorism, they can nevertheless pose a significant threat to society by facilitating the spread of radical ideologies through social groups.

Based on the EC’s definition of radicalisation we define the term recruitment as “the process of joining a group that embraces opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism”. This definition encloses a few important assumptions and implications regarding recruitment and its relationship with radicalisation. First and foremost we stress that recruitment is, at least to a certain extent, a gradual process that is a fundamental component of radicalisation. The essential element that links recruitment and radicalisation is the movement and process towards joining a certain group. Recruitment into a radical group is likely to accelerate and intensify the process of radicalisation and could even make the subtle difference between radicalisation and terrorism. The overlap between recruitment and radicalisation is illustrated by the aforementioned convictions of young Dutch Muslims for distribution of radical material. Although these acts can be seen as to facilitate recruitment into a radical group or ideology, the judges did not explicitly distinguished between radicalisation and recruitment and perceived the relevant acts as part of radicalisation processes. Hence, recruitment should, when discussing the causal factors of radicalisation, not be viewed as an independent development. Brian Jenkins (2007), terrorism and counterinsurgency expert at RAND, even refers to radicalisation as “the mental prerequisite to recruitment” (Jenkins, 2007: 2). In other words, there is no recruitment without radicalisation.

Importantly, we argue that recruitment does not necessarily have to involve a defined network of actors who are physically in each other’s presence. In contrast, we suggest that recruitment – and hence radicalisation – often involves the process of joining a virtual radical group in which the sense that others share ones ideology and beliefs provide the uniting factor (see for example, Mandaville, 2005).

Furthermore, we assume that people are only motivated to join a radical group when they have radicalised, or are at least appealed by radical attitudes and beliefs. This implies that joining a radical group is always a bilateral process that requires efforts from the group as well as the potential new member. Hence, the definition of recruitment accounts for recruitment of an individual by a group, with a focus on the role of the recruiting party attempting to persuade others to join an existing radical group, as well as self-recruitment, which focuses on the effort of an individual in the process of joining a
radical group (e.g., Sageman, 2004; Coolsaet, 2005; Bakker, 2006). As such, recruitment encompasses every act that in an important way facilitates or otherwise contributes to the process of joining a radical group, including incitement and distributing radical materials for others to radicalise by.

When attempting to describe the most essential characteristics of radicalisation, the question arises how “characteristics” should be interpreted. Given that determinants, indicators and causal factors can all be labelled characteristics, the term needs further specification. The present deliverable limits itself to an analysis of causal factors of radicalisation, first and foremost because prevention is better than a cure.

In other words, we are interested in understanding why people radicalise, not so much in what they look like once they have radicalised. An analysis of, for example, indicators or determinants of radicalisation might assist in recognising radicalising groups or individuals but will in our opinion fail to explain why some groups are more or less vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment than others. In-depth understanding of why some people do and others do not resort to extreme attitudes and behaviours is thus of profound importance for the development of effective interventions in the radicalisation process. We feel that this purpose is best served by investigating the causal factors, rather than indicators of radicalisation.

4. METHODOLOGY

An exploratory approach is chosen to investigate the most essential contributors to radicalisation. Initially, we aim to map the most relevant literature in the realm of radicalism studies. More specifically, we seek to identify the authors and publications that contribute significantly to the existing body of knowledge about the causes of radicalisation. In order to ascertain that the selected authors and studies are influential, their contributions to the two major peer-reviewed journals in terrorism studies are assessed: “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism”, and “Terrorism and Political Violence”. Additionally, the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) was consulted to estimate the authors’ and publications’ impact.
One of the downsides of this approach, however, is that not every important author is included in the SSCI, which hinders obtaining a full account of the impact of relevant literature. For example, neither Sageman’s publication “Understanding Terror Networks” nor “Strijders van Eigen Bodem” by Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, both of which are among the most influential publications on radicalisation, are included in the SSCI.

Additionally, the SSCI as well as the two peer-reviewed journals include only English language literature. Publications in other important languages like German or French do not come into sight by consultation of these sources. As such, selection of the relevant literature relies to a certain extent on our own reading of the field.

5. CAUSES AND CATALYSTS

Causal factors are categorised into two different axes. First, we distinguish between factors at the external, social and individual level respectively. These factors differ in the extent to which they contribute to radicalisation. More specifically, we expect that external factors do not have a direct effect on radicalisation but that this relationship is interceded by social and individual causal factors. Second, causal factors are divided into causes and catalysts that manifest themselves across all three levels and which are in turn subdivided into different dimensions. The following section discusses how the different measurement levels and dimensions in the model relate to each other. Figure 2 denotes a graphical representation of the theoretical framework of causal factors of radicalisation.
The individual, whose behaviour is regularly subjected to a variety of causes at different measurement levels, is in the centre of the model. From the outside inwards, the outside layer represents causes at the external level. External factors manifest themselves independently of the individual. They shape and constrain people’s environment, but individuals have only minor influence on their environment. External factors can be subdivided into political, economic and cultural dimensions.\textsuperscript{4} The political climate, for example, is an external factor. The actual influence of civilians in democratic states is small and political events generally occur outside the scope of individual civilians’ power. The same holds for economic or cultural developments like globalisation and industrialisation. External factors do not have a direct effect on individual behaviour.

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\textsuperscript{4} Religion and political ideologies are not considered singular causal factors, as they do not have a direct effect on individual behavior. They are regarded as sub-fields in the cultural and political sphere. For an elaboration on this issue, see 8.1.2. Please note that the three presented dimensions not necessarily are at the same level. Thus, economy and politics is assumed to be more susceptible to change, since they fluctuate much more than culture does.
which is illustrated by the effect of *absolute* deprivation. If poverty has a direct effect on radicalisation, how can we explain why many poor people never radicalise?

The answer lies in the fact that social contexts, including factors that refer to the individual in relation to others, influence human behaviour. Social factors, represented by the second or middle layer, refer to mechanisms that position the individual in relation to relevant others and hence can include people from in-groups as well as out-groups. Identification processes, network dynamics and relative deprivation are examples of dimensions into which social factors can be subdivided. The difference between external and social factors is reflected in the comparison between *absolute* and *relative* deprivation.\(^5\) While absolute deprivation refers to a lack of means to survive, relative deprivation focuses on the individual in relation to significant reference groups (Gurr, 1970).

A complex interaction between factors at the various levels is likely to be crucial for the intensity of the readiness for radicalisation. Social factors play an important intervening role in the relation between external factors and radicalisation. For example, stigmatisation of Islam in the media, an external cultural factor,\(^6\) is likely to impose a stronger radicalising force on Muslims than on non-Muslims.

The third and last layer represents causal factors at the *individual* level. At the individual level, psychological characteristics, personal experiences and rationality influence how people respond to their social and external environment. Whether people radicalise depends, for example, on their knowledge about and attitudes towards the political and economic climate, but also on the way they cope with major life events. In the model, individual causal factors are positioned closest to the individual. However, these factors are not necessarily assumed to exert the strongest influence on the individual’s behaviour. Rather, factors at all three measurement levels only lead to radicalisation through complex interactions involving factors at every level. The individual is the main focus of analysis in the present theoretical framework; the different levels represent the factors’ position in relation to the individual, which explains why external factors denote the outside layer and individual factors are found at the core. The causes in the model gradually influence the individual’s behaviour, which implies that at every

\(^5\) For a more extensive description of the subject see Par. 7.1.3.

\(^6\) Please note that stigmatization of Islam in the media for matters of definition is viewed as belonging to the cultural sphere – not because there is a culturally determined tendency to stigmatize Muslims in the media, but because the media is considered part of the cultural sphere.
stage in the radicalisation process, these factors steadily, although perhaps at times more intensely than at others, press the individual.

In addition to causes, *catalysts* are also causal factors that contribute to radicalisation. Catalysts can occur at the external as well as the social and individual level and often penetrate across all three measurement levels. They accelerate or catapult radicalisation processes but differ from causes in the sense that they do not initiate radicalisation. Whereas causes are structural factors that gradually influence the individual, catalysts are often unpredictable and volatile. Moreover, they vary per individual; others can discard as irrelevant what can be a trigger for one person, like provoking statements by public figures. Therefore, catalysts are not *reasons* for radicalisation but merely influencing factors for individuals in an advanced phase of radicalisation. The two catalysts that are distinguished in this context are *recruitment* and *trigger events*.

It should be emphasised that the causal factors could be categorised in several sensible ways. Most factors could theoretically be listed at both the external and social, sometimes even the individual level. To a large extent the levels and their dimensions overlap. The external factor "poor integration", for example, can manifest itself in a political, economic and cultural dimension. Nevertheless, without claiming that this classification is all-inclusive, it is a comprehensive way of integrating and organising the most frequently mentioned contributors to radicalisation.

6. **CAUSAL FACTORS AT THE EXTERNAL LEVEL**

6.1. *Causes*

6.1.1. *Political causes*

Poor integration\(^7\) is frequently mentioned as a prominent cause of radicalisation. Research has shown that Muslim communities in Europe are often not completely integrated. In 2006, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUCM\(^1\)) published a study on discrimination of Muslims in the Member States of the European Union, which included a report consisting of interviews with European Muslims (2006\(^2\)). In general, respondents felt that the needs of Muslims are not a priority for policy makers and public authorities. Moreover, many respondents felt that Muslims are

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\(^7\) Please note that integration is for matters of definition placed as part of the political sphere.
underrepresented in public institutions and organisations, which, according to the respondents, hinders identification with such institutions. Most of the respondents were of the opinion that institutional support for Muslims challenging religious discrimination is lacking, and that at times, invitations for Muslims to participate in public debates do not represent genuine attempts to get Muslims involved (2006\(^2\)). Generally, these findings are supported by findings by Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006), who point to the fact that Moroccans in The Netherlands are severely underrepresented in governmental institutions.

Poor integration of Muslim communities in Western societies implies that groups of people are excluded from active participation in the public domain. In a series of articles and with a variety of co-authors, Baumeister and Twenge showed that when excluded from social groups, individuals tend to become less pro-social (Twenge, Baumeister & DeWall, 2007) engage in self-defeating behaviour (Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002) and demonstrate aggressive action tendencies, even against targets who are not the source of rejection (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). The core conclusion of their work is that the need to belong is one of the most significant motivations for social interactions (Baumeister & Leary, 2005).

Although in Baumeister’s and Twenge’s research subjects were individually excluded from group membership, their findings provide an indication that exclusion of groups as entities can likewise instigate negative and aggressive attitudes and behaviours. As will become clear in later sections on the effect of social identification issues on radicalisation, group membership is one of the most important indicators of social behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; 1984; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). Even more so, it has been shown that under some circumstances, people can experience emotions on behalf of their in-group and can be motivated to act toward group goals, especially when the group is being threatened (e.g., Smith, 1993). In particular for people who identify strongly with the relevant social group, threats of the group can be perceived and treated as personal threats, indicating that exclusion of a self-relevant group can trigger similar responses as exclusion of the self. As such, poor integration and exclusion of Muslims in Western societies might lay a significant foundation for radicalisation and polarisation.
Political events are often thought to incubate Muslim fundamentalism, not only at national or local levels, but also at the international and global level. Around the world, Muslims appear to feel that the West is fighting Islam. Al-Zawahiri for example, Bin Laden’s deputy, often accuses the West of engaging in a “new crusade” against Muslims (CNN, 2005). An opinion poll among British Muslims, conducted for the BBC, showed that the majority of British Muslims feel that the ‘war on terror’ is actually a war on Islam (BBC News, 2003). In particular, conflicts in the Middle-East and the diplomatic position of Western governments in these conflicts are believed to contribute to radicalisation. Robert Pape, in consensus with other scholars (e.g., Benzakour, 2001; AIVD, 2004; Kepel, 2004), argues in a series of publications (e.g. Pape, 2003; 2005; 2005; 2006) that terrorist organisations, both in the West and in the Middle East, apply strategic decision making to employ suicide bombings to coerce Western democracies to withdraw combat forces from Islamic territory.

6.1.2. Economic causes

Economic deprivation and poverty are frequently mentioned in discussions about the origins of terrorism (see for example, Gurr, 1970; Portes, 1971; Muller, 1985; Lichbach, 1989; Brock Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004; 2004; 2004; 2004; 2004; 2004; 2004; 2004; 2004; 2006; Bravo & Dias, 2006; Franz, 2007). The question arises, however, whether such a causal relationship actually exists. Research has shown that although the majority of European radicalised Muslims stem from lower socio-economic strata of society, radical Muslims are distributed across all socio-economic classes (e.g., Sageman 2004; Bakker, 2006).

On the one hand, Brock Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004; 2004) suggest that a negative association exists between a country’s economic situation and the occurrence of terrorism. The authors argue that in times of economic deprivation, the likelihood of terrorism increases. The decision to engage in terrorist activity is based on opportunities and constraints. According to the authors, terrorism can become a rational and attractive behavioural alternative for economically marginalised social groups.

On the other hand, Krueger and Malečková (2003) came forth with an oft-cited publication in which they refute the hypothesis that economic deprivation is the wellspring of terrorism, a statement that was supported by RAND economist Berrebi (2003). Krueger and Malečková scrutinise public opinion polls from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to define which social groups express higher levels of support for armed attacks on Israeli civilians. Their findings mainly show
that people with higher educational levels mostly supported violence against Israelis. Additionally, compared to people in similar age groups; the educational level of Hezbollah participants is slightly above average.

Although scholars do not agree as to whether a causal relationship between poverty and radicalisation exists, we argue that such a relation would in any case not be a direct one, but dependent on social and individual factors. The fact that not every poor person radicalises indicates that other factors intervene in the relationship between economic deprivation and radicalisation. As a consequence, several authors have focused on relative rather than absolute deprivation as a possible cause for radicalism. As relative deprivation refers to a subjective perception of being unfairly disadvantaged in relation to reference groups, its effect will be further discussed in the section on causal factors at the social level.

6.1.3. Cultural causes

Research has shown that Muslims in Europe are frequently confronted with discrimination and stigmatization of their religion. Muslims in the Netherlands and Europe are often confronted with stigmatization of their religion, and discrimination. The EUCM report on discrimination of European Muslims concludes that “it is evident that Muslims often experience various levels of discrimination and marginalization in employment, education and housing, and are also victims of negative stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes” (2006: 110), and that these issues pose considerable threats to Muslim integration. The negative stereotypes and stigmatization of Muslims do not directly relate to Islam. However, it often concerns issues, such as repression of women, honor killings, or circumcision of young girls, which are associated by non-Muslims with Islam, but that are in fact related to (regional) culture. In fact, these issues are also considered ‘Islamic’ by some Muslim groups, indicating that culture and religion are very much intertwined.

In addition, globalisation and modernisation facilitate frequent interaction between different religions and cultures, which in the opinion of some theoreticians coincides with an increased likelihood of interethnic and intercultural conflicts. Even if business is one of the main drivers of globalisation, globalisation and modernisation are considered here cultural, rather than political or economic factors because both developments involve social and cultural
convergence\textsuperscript{8}, for example manifested by westernisation and global media coverage.

These products of globalisation facilitate the emergence of transnational ideological movements that spread radical Jihadi messages and reach large populations of Muslims around the globe. In a discussion of global Salafism, Quindin Wiktorowicz (2001) outlines how this transnational Salafi movement connects Muslims into a virtual community through a common approach to Islam. According to Wiktorowicz, the Salafi movement is the most rapidly expanding Islamic movement and has profound influence on Islamic practice and ideological orientations of Muslims throughout the world (Wiktorowicz, 2001). Such extensive spread of radical interpretations of Islam are by-products of globalisation and symbolise the rapid expansion of transnational, virtual networks that serve as platforms for transnational opinion formation and recruitment into radical movements. Or, as Reuven Paz (2002) puts it: “These means of globalisation encourages the ’brotherhood of the oppressed’”.

Globalisation and modernisation are often suggested to cause conflicts in which Islam and the West are confronted, as well as conflicts within Muslim communities. First, Benjamin Barber (1995) postulates that the aggressive force of modernisation and globalisation dissolves social and economic barriers and exports capitalism to all parts of the world, a mechanism which he elegantly named ‘McWorld’, as it confronts Muslims all over the world with consumerism, modern technologies and emancipation. According to Barber, globalisation increases economic deprivation for lower class societies and globally confronts Muslims with values and events that are originally refuted by the Koran and Islamic culture. According to Barber, fundamentalist Islamists believe that Islam cannot co-exist with the Western form of modernism, and perceive the rapid rise of westernisation as an attempt of the Western world to gain control over the Islamic world.

Second, developments within Islam are believed to contribute to Muslim fundamentalism. Gilles Kepel (2002) for example, suggests that radicalisation of Muslims is partly the result of conflicts between moderate and radical movements within Islam. According to Olivier Roy (1994; 2004), one of the most famous authors on political Islam, globalisation changes the relationship of Muslims to Islam. The borders between Islam and the West are becoming increasingly vague, which is, according to Roy, the result of de-territorialisation. Some interpretations of Islam are increasingly disconnected from a specific territory or culture, and new forms of religiosity

\textsuperscript{8} For a critique of this approach to globalization, see Ronald Inglehart in (Inglehart, 2005).
create new communities that organise themselves solely around religion.\(^9\) The *Ummah* ("Community of Believers") becomes a transnational, virtual community. Religion in a global Islam is based not on culture, but on a dynamic and adaptable set of norms. It is no longer tied to any specific culture or country, but rather adaptable to different environments (Roy, 2004). This universal Islam – often referred to as ‘cut and paste’ Islam – particularly attracts young Muslims feeling alienated and excluded in Western societies, because it offers a set of behavioural rules. With this line of reasoning, Roy rejects the hypothesis that today’s Muslim fundamentalism is rooted in the Middle Eastern conflict. It is in his view rather the outcome of a westernisation of Middle-Eastern societies. An interesting paradox arises: the states and societies that radical Islamist movements reject and disgust the most are the same states and societies that shaped these movements.

6.2. Catalysts

6.2.1. Recruitment

Recruitment is an important potential catalyst that can manifest itself at the external, social and individual level.

When we assume that only people who have radicalised or are radicalising face incentives to join a radical group, the implication arises that recruitment can only occur in a later stage of the radicalisation process. In itself, recruitment is therefore not believed to be capable of starting radical emotions or beliefs. In other words, recruitment can only accelerate radicalisation processes; it cannot initiate radicalisation.

Although potential group members always play an active role in the recruitment process, *top down* selection of new recruits is believed to be the most common at the external level. Giles Kepel (2004) is only one of many authors (AIVD, 2002; 2004\(^1\); Taarnby, 2005), who points to the possibility that al-Qaeda leaders are recruiting new supporters in Europe for their anti-western jihad. This mechanism is illustrated by the case of Muriel Demagauque, the Belgian woman who detonated a bomb she was carrying in order to kill American soldiers in Iraq in 2005. She was allegedly recruited by several men who went to trial in October 2007 for attempting to also recruit several other people in Belgium (Reuters, 2007).

\(^9\) Thus, Olivier Roy denotes this neo-fundamentalism because of its sole reliance on text – that is on the Koran and the Sunna – which means that it is free of the cultural connotations of the different Middle Eastern countries and therefore is well suited for globalisation. (Roy, 2004).
Marc Sageman (2004) also argues that, although joining jihad is often a bottom-up process, the existence of relationships with members of the relevant radical movement is often crucial. Alleged Hofstad Group member Samir Azzouz, for example, attempted to participate in the violent jihad in Chechnya but failed to enter the country because he lacked relevant acquaintances.

6.2.2. Trigger Events

In her famous publication “The Roots of Terrorism” (1981), Martha Crenshaw distinguishes explicitly between factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run, also referred to as preconditions and root causes, and situational factors that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism, also known as precipitants or trigger causes. The latter category includes events that call for revenge or action, such as violence against in-groups, police brutality, and contested elections, but also provoking acts committed by hostile out-groups or compromising speeches by public figures. The Abu Ghraib scandal for example, where Iraqi prisoners were humiliated and abused by American soldiers, prompted angry and violent responses in Muslims around the world. The protests all over the Muslim world of cartoons of Muhammad printed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten is another example of a triggering event, which might intensify already existing radicalisation processes. We hypothesise that trigger events, like recruitment, are incapable of initiating radicalisation processes but that they can abruptly intensify them.

In conclusion, external factors influence the individual’s behavioural alternatives. However, it should be stressed that their radicalising effect is limited. The degree to which external factors lead to radicalisation depends on the way in which individuals and their social environment respond to these externalities. The upcoming sections discuss the effect of social factors on radicalisation.
7. **CAUSAL FACTORS AT THE SOCIAL LEVEL**

7.1. **Causes**

7.1.1. **Social identification**

Identification with social groups is a particularly accurate predictor of social behaviour and is, as such, probably one of the most important intervening factors at the social level. To a large extent, how we behave depends on whom we identify with.

Some social identity approaches (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; 1984; Ellemers et al., 2002) argue that people define themselves not so much in terms of self, but in terms of group membership. This implies that we only feel good about ourselves if we feel good about the group. We can have as many social identities as groups with which we identify. For example, people can identify themselves on basis of sex, ethnicity, profession, religion, or based on the sports club we support. Which identity becomes salient or prominent depends on context. When we are watching a club football match, our identity as supporter of a given team is, with a few notable exceptions probably much more important than our national or religious identity.

Regarding radicalisation, the implications of the importance of a satisfactory social identity manifest themselves in two ways. First, an identity crisis can have profound implications for our well-being and behaviour. An identity crisis can emerge when the group we wish to affiliate with rejects us, or when we are unsure which group we identify with. Young Muslims are often thought to face such an identity crisis in which Islamic and Western cultures conflict (Choudhury, 2007; Malik, 2007). Buijs and his colleagues (2006) for example, suggest that Moroccan youngsters in The Netherlands feel alienated from both their parents and Dutch society, and have a hybrid identity that is not recognised and accepted by their direct environment. As a way out, they find a satisfactory identity in the *Ummah* that binds them with other Muslims and for which nationality, be it Moroccan or Dutch, becomes irrelevant. The more they invest in this identity and the more their friends adopt it, the stronger the identification will become.

Second, the importance of social identification reflects that a threat of the group will be perceived and treated as a personal threat (e.g., Smith, 1993). A threat of a valued social identity generally leads to in-group favouritism (e.g., Smurda, Wittig and Gokalp, 2006) and out-group derogation (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As signalled by Olivier Roy (2004), a threat of their religious identity can prompt Muslims to withdraw
into a strictly specified, inward-focused community that is obsessed by its own borders. These mechanisms can occur irrespective of whether the threat was real or perceived.

In times of an identity threat, other identities are expected to become irrelevant. For a woman who is applying for a job and finds herself being discriminated based on gender, it will probably be momentarily irrelevant that she also perceives herself as a Christian or European citizen. The same holds for Muslims. Based on social identity approaches that suggest that the stronger people identify with the relevant in-group, the stronger they will respond to identity threats (e.g., Ellemers et al. 2002), we hypothesise that especially for high identifiers (e.g., people who identify strongly with the relevant social group), perceived discrimination or stigmatisation based on Islam is expected to trigger their religious identity to be the most prominent indicator of attitudes and behaviour. Whether or not they also feel Dutch or Moroccan thus becomes irrelevant; they feel they are Muslim and they feel threatened as Muslims.

7.1.2. Network dynamics

Radicals, like everybody else, are embedded in complex interaction systems that shape and constrain their behaviour. Others have more influence on their behaviour than they might think, even if they consciously choose to follow them. Only the mere presence of a charismatic leader, for instance, can affect whether and how people and groups radicalise. Expectedly, the need to belong can drive youngsters directly into the arms of captivating leaders, who might be capable of instilling radical views and attitudes in young, receptive Muslims. In turn, radical views can be transmitted through social groups.

There are several ways in which social networks influence people’s tendencies to radicalise. First and foremost, similarity breeds connection. As Sageman (2004) and Bakker (2006) also found, members of the same network are often homogenous with respect to socio-demographic characteristics, but also with respect to their attitudes and behaviour (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). This phenomenon is referred to as homophily and indicates that people invest in relationships with people who share their opinions and beliefs. Likewise, social influence prompts people to adopt attitudes and behaviours of others in the network (Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950; Marsden & Friedkin, 1993; Valente, Gallaher & Mouttapa, 2004; Valente, Ritt-Olson, Stacy, Unger, Okamoto & Sussman, 2007).
Moreover, James Coleman (1990) argues that in networks where network members share opinions and attitudes, social norms develop that prescribe and regulate behaviour. Mutual encouragement and punishment in network structures enforce norm conformity and even allow for the emergence of zealous behaviour. In return for acknowledgement and behavioural confirmation, but also in order to avoid punishment – or because they believe it is the right thing to do – individual group members can make considerable sacrifices on behalf of the group (Coleman, 1990). For example, extreme forms of norm compliance can play a considerable role in the emergence of suicide terrorism.

Marc Sageman (2004) illustrates how group processes can lead to violent radicalisation and ultimately terrorist behaviour. Friendship bonds are critical, he claims. Not only are radical ideas and attitudes transmitted through these relationships, the reinforcing power of group norms that play a role in these friendships also has a strong effect on the emergence of radicalisation.

Hence, in social networks radical ideologies and attitudes can easily develop and spread through well-documented social mechanisms like social influence and homophily. Charismatic leaders and influential network members are capable of exerting strong influence on general opinion formation and behaviour in networks. The propagation of radical interpretations of Islam that prescribe extreme religious devotion and refutation of any Western value interacts with radicalisation of thought by producing an increased pressure and willingness to act on behalf of one’s religious convictions.

In relation to the radicalising effect of network dynamics, two ‘environments’ deserve further notice: Internet and prisons.

7.1.2.1. The role of the Internet

Increasingly, attention is being paid to the role that the Internet plays in radicalisation of young Muslims. In the present study, the use of the Internet is perceived as a causal factor at the social level rather than at the external level. First and foremost, the Internet is a prominent facilitator of network formation and interpersonal interaction. As noted earlier, a radical movement can exist of a virtual group in which people who have never met are nevertheless connected through shared attitudes and ideology. The Internet is a perfect instrument to establish a ‘deterritorialised’ virtual network of believers (Roy, 2004). As such, it enhances opinion formation and offers a platform for young, identity-seeking
Muslims to express their grievances and obtain membership of a social group. Or, in the words of Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber: “The anonymity of the web facilitates communication on sensitive issues without exposure and thus to a certain degree neutralizes pressure from governments. The internet has provided young Muslims, particularly in Europe, with a virtual community that serves primarily to ease the emotional strain on Muslim immigrants experiencing the difficulties of adapting to a new environment and feeling a need to maintain their religious identity” (2005: 31).

Further, the Internet does not only facilitate opinion formation and interaction possibilities between like-minded individuals or groups, it also contains a plethora of publicly accessible documentation (e.g., Mandaville, 1999; Anderson, 2000). The AIVD states that the Internet plays an important role in radicalisation processes and that radical documentation is widely spread online. The AIVD even goes so far as referring to the Internet as “a turbo propelling the global violent jihad movement” (2006: 43).

7.1.2.2. The role of prisons

Prisons are often thought to be a fertile foundation for radicalisation. The feeling of being collectively marginalised can provide a strong binding factor among identity-seeking inmates. Not only are reasons for social identification abundant, the personal networks of convicts are rather limited, making it more attractive for inmates to adopt the attitudes and actions of influential others. Imams, be they contracts or volunteers, play an essential role in radicalisation and recruitment processes in prisons (Van Duyn, 2006). Especially Muslims with little knowledge of Islam are likely to attach great value to the words of imams on religious matters. Such attributed authority makes prison imams particularly influential when it comes to incubating and spreading radical attitudes through prisons (Olsen, 2008).

There are some examples of prison radicalisation. For example Richard Reid, the ‘shoe bomber’ who attempted to destroy a commercial airplane by igniting bombs that were hidden in his shoes, allegedly radicalised while in prison (e.g., Rupp & Erickson, 2006). Mohammed Bouyeri, Theo van Gogh’s murderer, also became interested in radical interpretations of Islam while imprisoned (Benschop, 2005).

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10 For a critique of the claim that the internet functions as a “virtual training camp” for violent radicalization and terrorism, see (Nesser, 2008)
7.1.3. Relative deprivation

Many scholars have provided support for the hypothesis that relative deprivation can trigger violent, collective action, even for people who are not personally deprived but act on behalf of the group (e.g., Runciman, 1966; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Tiraboschi & Maass, 1998). One of the first and probably most influential publications on relative deprivation in relation to political unrest is Gurr’s ‘Why men rebel’ (1970), in which the author defines relative deprivation as “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and the goods and their value capabilities” (p. 24). In other words, a discrepancy between what people believe they are rightfully entitled to and what they expect to obtain can cause a perception of deprivation. People can thus be subjectively deprived irrespective of whether basic needs are met, and vice versa, abject poverty does not necessarily bring about relative deprivation in the poor. Gurr suggests that the inability to obtain what is felt to be justified triggers feelings of frustration that ultimately facilitates the emergence of collective violence. Relative deprivation does not necessarily have to result from comparison with reference groups, however. Rather, “an individual’s point of reference may be his own past condition, an abstract ideal, or the standards articulated by a leader as well as a ‘reference group’,” according to Gurr (1970: 25).

Indeed, Davies’ theory of rising expectations (1962; 1969) shows how deprivation can be relative not only in relation to relevant others, but also relative to people’s own expectations and previous fulfilsments. According to Davies, people for whom living standards are improving tend to overestimate the pace with which they feel their life should improve. As a result, a gap exists between people’s expectations and the reality they face. The ensuing frustration increases the likelihood of social unrest and revolutionary moods (Davies, 1962). Although both Gurr and Davies base their theoretical elaborations on the frustration-aggression hypothesis, Davies additionally stresses that time is a crucial element in generating aggravation and that initial satisfaction can lead to frustration when expectations are not met.

At the time, Gurr’s publication provided conscientious insights into social and psychological circumstances under which political violence is likely to occur, although it suffers a few major weaknesses. First and foremost, Gurr uses an interdisciplinary approach in which a giant heap of theories is subsumed to fit the frustration – aggression
hypothesis. Second, his theory has little predictive value as it is difficult to falsify: after all, political violence is commonly preceded by a sense of frustration or dissatisfaction. Even more so, the frustration – aggression hypothesis is in itself far from sufficient to explain radicalism as it fails to explain why the majority of economically frustrated people never radicalise. In fact, Walter Laqueur (1978; 2001; 2004) is only one of many scholars advocating that terrorists are, in general, not poor or from lower socio-economic strata. Laqueur argues that like all social phenomena radicalism and terrorism lack a comprehensive, unilateral explanation; herewith implying that neither absolute nor relative deprivation can provide a satisfactory explanation for these phenomena. These comments notwithstanding, Gurr offers far-reaching insights into the emergence of political violence and credence must be paid to the fact that Gurr remains among the few scholars to have explicitly addressed the relationship between relative deprivation and collective political violence.

7.2. Catalysts

7.2.1. Recruitment

At the social level, groups frequently recruit themselves for violent jihad. Marc Sageman (2004) for example, shows how the Hamburg Cell, accomplices in the ‘9/11’ attack in New York, radicalised as a group of friends. During the radicalisation process, the majority travelled to Afghanistan where they collectively joined al-Qaeda. Most of the members of the Hamburg Cell actively participated in planning the ‘9/11’ attacks.

7.2.2. Trigger events

Networks and personal relationships can be affected by unexpectedly occurring events that can manifest themselves at external, social, and individual level. For example, group discussions about public events can enhance radical attitudes of individual group members. Additionally, disturbed group processes and events affecting peers can affect radicalisation. For instance, the arrest of a group member or the failure of a friend to find a job can prompt others to radicalise even further or engage in violence.

8. **CAUSAL FACTORS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL**
8.1. Causes

8.1.1. Psychological characteristics

Although the conventional thinking used to be that radicals are crazy, scholars nowadays agree that radicals, even terrorists, are all but extraordinary. Even more so, their inevitable conclusion is that no socio-demographic, let alone psychological profile of radical groups and their members exists (see for example, Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006), which makes it increasingly difficult to identify potentially vulnerable groups.

Victoroff (2005) provided an overview of theories of terrorist behaviour and came up with a variety of psychological variables on which radicals can potentially be distinguished from each other, and from non-radicals. For instance, and to a large extent this is influenced by culture, some people are simply more violent, anti-social, or aggressive, than others. According to Victoroff, radicals might be particularly sensitive to humiliation or perceived oppression, they might be novelty seeking, identity seeking, depressed, anxious, or vulnerable to charismatic influence. Perhaps they are, in comparison to non-radicals, more impulsive and lacking self-control. However, no research has confirmed that radicals indeed match these descriptions (e.g., Sageman, 2004; Bakker 2006). Simply put, radicals do not have a psychological profile that sets them apart as a psychological category.

8.1.2. Personal experiences

The decisions people make are often based on personal experiences, and major life events can lead to radicalisation. Some scholars have argued, for example, that radicalism and engagement in terrorism is a typical outcome of traumatising, sometimes abusive childhoods (e.g., Akhtar, 1999; Borum, 2004). DeMause even claims rigorously that the causes of terrorism should not be found "in this or that American foreign policy error, but in the extremely abusive families of the terrorists" (2002: 340).

Arguably, individual experiences can be divided into two categories: cognitive versus emotional experiences. Whereas cognitions refer to people’s knowledge and thoughts and to how people process their environment, emotions are fast, unstable and triggered automatically.

At a cognitive level, what people know and believe about the world around them affects how they perceive their environment, and hence how they respond to causal factors at the external and social level. Radical interpretations of religion and society can therefore provide the wellspring of radicalisation and terrorism. However, we suggest that in themselves, radical ideologies or radical interpretations of religion are not direct
causes of radicalisation. People differ in the extent to which they are susceptible to or appealed by radical ideologies, and are at some times more vulnerable than at other times. Moreover, we assume that in general, people do not turn to violent, hate-spreading ideologies without reason. That is, the mere fact that an individual adheres to radical ideologies is rather an indicator of radicalisation than a direct causal factor. Rather, adherence to radial ideologies is the outcome of an accumulation of causal factors that instil the urge or desire to commit to radical ideologies. For example, Mohammed Bouyeri, Theo van Gogh’s murderer, merely became attracted to radical interpretations of Islam after he had been imprisoned and his mother had died (Benschop, 2005). Nevertheless, although we argue that the presence of radical ideologies are mostly symbols of radicalisation, such ideologies can become embedded in the individual’s mindset and subsequently become a driving factor after the radicalisation processes have started. Ideologies can likewise guide an already radicalised person in a certain direction, thus giving impetus to what action is acceptable, necessary and what targets are to be hit.

In 2006, the Dutch psychologists Meertens, Prins and Doosje came up with an extensive overview of psychological theories of radical behaviour. The authors show that well-investigated and predictable processes involving power, leadership, and normative pressure in social groups can explain how ordinary people engage in rather extraordinary behaviour. One of the theories the authors apply for explaining radicalisation is Festingers (1957) cognitive dissonance theory.

‘Cognitive dissonance’ refers to a psychological phenomenon that emerges when people’s behaviour is in conflict with their attitudes or beliefs. One of the typical responses to such discomfort is that people increasingly start believing what they say. For instance, the more often people express statements that are more radical than their actual opinions, the more they will start believing the accurateness of those statements. Second, people can respond to cognitive dissonance by over-justification. The more radicals have invested in the radicalisation process, for instance because they broke relationships with family members to gain membership of a radical group, the more they will believe that membership was indeed worth sacrificing family ties for. Due to cognitive dissonance, radicalising people will become even more committed to their radical views or network. Indeed, Roy’s (2004) observation that faith and commitment increasingly have to be proven in order to become a member of a religious community
signals that cognitive dissonance can play an essential role in the emergence of radicalisation.

Further, emotional experiences are believed to contribute to radicalisation. Sarraj (2002) for example, suggested that feelings of guilt, shame and the desire for revenge are prominent causes of suicide terrorism. Additionally, Muslims around the world are thought to feel humiliated (e.g., Stern 1999; 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Lindner, 2006; Richardson, 2006). In his Declaration of War, parts of which were broadcast on Al Jazeera and CNN, Osama bin Laden explicitly mentions the term humiliation several times. “Death is better than life in humiliation”, he says. If we assume that people who feel humiliated will search for ways to restore their dignity, these statements should alarm us that the role of perceived humiliation, and similar emotional experiences, in the emergence of terrorism should not be underestimated.

8.1.3. Rationality

Individuals turn to radicalism for different reasons, some of which are more conscious than others. Some people join radical groups for ideological motivations or to engage in political action, whereas others are simply attracted by action and adventure, or seek group membership to obtain a positive identity.\textsuperscript{11} Just as there is no psychological profile that matches each and every radical, individual motivations to radicalise are abundant and unique. The question arises whether radicalism can be a product of rational choice, where actors are assumed to be fully informed and utility-maximising.

Among others (for an overview see McCormick, 2003), Martha Crenshaw is one of the most frequently cited representatives of rational choice approaches to violent radicalisation and terrorism (1981; 1998). She emphasised that the decision to engage in terrorism is a rational political choice that is influenced by psychological and strategic considerations on constraints and benefits.\textsuperscript{12} Rational choice approaches of terrorism do face difficulties, however. Gutpa (2004) for example suggests that rational choice theories cannot account for Olson’s (1965) collective action problem where individual actors do not have sufficient incentives to engage in terrorist activity.

\textsuperscript{11}This off course still leaves open the question why they chose a radical Islamist group instead of the Hell’s Angels, the mafia, the army or a group of hooligans.

\textsuperscript{12}For a more detailed description of Crenshaw’s (1981) deliberations on the causes of terrorism see Work package 3: ‘Exploring root and trigger causes of terrorism’
Again, it should be emphasised that radicalisation differs from terrorism. Irrespective of its successfulness, terrorism can be perceived as a tool that can be employed to achieve one’s goals. Participation in terrorist activity requires an active, conscious decision, whereas radicalisation is a gradual process that generally does not have a clearly defined beginning or end state. Radicalisation is merely a process of the state of mind that yields a shift in attitudes and behaviour and, thus, serves, a less specified function. Hence, although rational choice approaches (e.g. Lake, 2002; Ferrero, 2002) can shed light on potential strategic benefits of terrorism, we suggest that the theory cannot suffice in explaining radicalisation.

8.2. Catalysts
8.2.1. Recruitment

In particular, mosques and prisons are infamous for facilitating top down recruitment of potential adherers of radical Islam. Even more so, however, recruitment at the individual level is increasingly marked by self-enlistment. For young Muslims in search of their identity, joining a fundamentalist organisation can be a fruitful way of developing and enhancing their social identity (e.g., Johnson & Feldman, 1992; Post, 1987). The notion that high levels of loyalty and solidarity exist within cohesive and powerful terrorist organisations, increase the attractiveness for potential members.

8.2.2. Trigger events

At the individual level, trigger events that accelerate radicalisation are abundant. For instance, individual strategies to cope with major life events can make the difference for somebody who is on the verge of radicalising. People who have difficulties coping with traumatic events, like becoming a victim of physical violence or the death of a friend, might respond to such devastating events by delving into depth into radical ideologies. Also, individual perceptions of social and external trigger events can contribute to radicalisation. Somebody who perceives a public speech by the prime minister as provocative is much more likely to respond with anger or aggression than somebody who does not feel offended. Hence, trigger events at individual level are plentiful and unique for each and every individual.
9. VULNERABILITY

After having given a literature-based overview of the most essential causal factors of radicalisation, the question arises which social groups are most affected by these factors. In other words, which social groups are most vulnerable for radicalisation?

Crucially, we have to conclude that it is as impossible as it is undesirable to specifically define the social groups that are most susceptible to radicalisation tendencies. First and foremost it is essential to realise that social groups do not radicalise, individuals do. That is, there can be no collective radicalisation when individual group members are not radicalising. The focus of analysis should therefore not be at the level of (large) social groups, but at the individual level (or at the level of small groups, consisting of for example four or five people in which most known radicalisation processes have occurred). It is often only a minority of a minority who turns to radicalism. For example, according to the latest estimations over 857,000 Muslims live in the Netherlands, comprising approximately five percent of the total population (CBS, 2007). Between 20,000 thousand and 30,000 Muslims are believed to feel attracted to Salafi ideologies and, according to the Dutch minister of Integration, 2,500 are potentially susceptible to violent radicalisation (Kloor, 2007). In other words, in the Netherlands, not even 0.3 percent of the total Muslim population should be considered potentially dangerous. Of this group, only about a dozen have been sentenced for terrorist activities, including the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. This represents only 0.5 percent of those considered potentially susceptible to violent radicalisation.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that current knowledge about radicalisation processes is essentially limited. Despite the extensive amount of literature on the causes and consequences of radicalisation, fundamental knowledge about who radicals are and, more importantly, why they commit to extreme and often violent ideologies remains lacking. Even more so, preceding research has demonstrated that radicals, let alone those who engage in terrorism, do not match a specified demographic or psychological profile. Not only do they stem from different age categories, socio-economic strata, and cultural backgrounds (e.g., Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006), they are generally not characterised by psychological peculiarities or deviating personality types.
(e.g., Victoroff, 2005). As long as in-depth understanding of the prime grounds and inspirations for radical’s attitudes and behaviours is lacking it is impossible to identify vulnerable individuals, let alone categorise them into different groupings. Doing so will only make sense when sufficient knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of radicalisation is available. Therefore, as the only common distinctive at present seems to be that all these individuals have been labelled ‘radical’, it seems yet unattainable as well as objectionable to denote them in terms of group affiliation.

The most prominent implication that arises from these elaborations is that we can only aim to assess of which groups the individual members seem most susceptible; we cannot draw any conclusions about the vulnerability of social groups as entities. Radicalisation is an individual development. The combinations of causal factors that motivate people to radicalise are unique per person. And the various factors have stronger radicalising effects on some individuals than on others. For example, some people are heavily influenced by social identification issues, while others are prominently inspired by group discussions on political matters.

Secondly, as noted earlier, the discussed factors are assumed to lay the foundation for different types of radicalism, not only Islamist radicalism. Assessing the vulnerability of collective entities, and subsequently developing policy measures that target these particular groups, therefore enhances the risk that groups receive biased and unequal treatment by governmental and societal institutions. Rather than curbing the reasons for radicalisation such measures may possibly enhance stereotyping and stigmatisation, hereby even increasing the likelihood of polarisation and intergroup conflicts.

Consequently, the present study refrains from categorising individuals into potentially vulnerable groups and only aims to shed light on the circumstances that make individuals, in terms of independent actors as well as members of social groups, more likely to be drawn to radicalism. Who are exposed, and how, to which causal factors? The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), who did feel the need to look into vulnerability of social groups, introduced a few useful indicators of vulnerability that are generally supported by the theories described in the present study. For example, perceptions of marginalisation, exclusion, and discrimination, as well as a generational gap and religious or ethnic persecution increase the susceptibility to radical ideologies, according to the Ministry.
Based on the foregoing discussion on the causal factors of radicalisation, a few general statements about vulnerability can be made. First, people who are exposed to these causal factors are more vulnerable to radicalisation than people who are not. For example, people who belong to social groups that are politically, economically, or culturally marginalised and poorly integrated, have greater incentives to rebel than people belonging to groups that are not. Second, as the number of causal factors and intensity of exposure increases, so does the potential for radicalisation. Somebody who belongs to a marginalised social group, who experiences discrimination, who feels humiliated as well as depressed, and who has recently lost a family member, is more likely to turn to radicalism than somebody who is only relatively deprived.

In addition to these general statements, a few particular findings stand out, although it must be noted that these are merely examples of an abundance of indicators of vulnerability. First, high-identifiers with relevant social groups are more vulnerable than low-identifiers. For example, both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Europe can be angry about and responsive to perceiving Muslims around the world being humiliated. However, social identification approaches (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ellemers et al., 2002) predict that in such particular events, Muslims will respond more strenuously to such perceptions because they identify more strongly with the relevant in-group. Moreover, as signalled by the very small proportion of Muslims that is potentially appealed to radical ideologies, only Muslims for whom being a Muslim is of strong emotional significance to their self-concept are likely to be drawn to radicalism when they perceive their in-group to be threatened. This indicates that when defining the most vulnerable members of society, specific attention should be paid to those who demonstrate strong identification with groups that are heavily affected by causal factors of radicalisation.

Second, the importance of social identification in predicting human behaviour implies that identity-seeking individuals are particularly likely to be appealed by radical groups and ideologies that provide an identity as well as behavioural guidelines. For instance, second-generation Muslims who feel not completely accepted by their parents’ generation as well as their ‘autochthonous’ peers often turn to strong identification with the Ummah (e.g., Buijs et al., 2006). The stronger the need to belong is, the more these individuals will be susceptible to peer pressure and norm-conformity in order to affiliate with a social group. The more, also, they will be motivated to prove faith and loyalty to common values of the group. As such, the need for a satisfactory social identity
inherently brings forth the urge to belong to a social group and, subsequently, creates incentives to adapt to radical attitudes and opinions of others. As a consequence, the need to belong might drive young, identity seeking individuals into the arms of potential recruits and radical groups.

In sum, the complexity of the underlying mechanisms that lead to radicalisation signals that it is impossible to identify specific social groups that are likely to be drawn to radical ideologies. Not only is radicalisation a unique and individual circumstance, the proportion of potentially radicalising individuals is too small and diverse to categorise them into strictly specified groups. This makes developing a counter-radicalisation policy to deal with potential vulnerable individuals or groups a very difficult task. The most prominent conclusion that can be drawn about vulnerability reflects the importance of social identification issues in predicting social behaviour. Individuals who categorise themselves as members of minorities that they perceive to be harmed or threatened in any way, are most likely to respond by means of aggression and negative attitude formation, which could eventually lead to radicalisation and violent outbursts.

Thus, young second generation European nationals, who are Muslims and who can be classified as identity seeking and as high-identifiers with the perception of Muslims around the world being humiliated, who are poorly integrated and politically, socially and culturally marginalised would as individuals have a higher than normal incentive to be drawn towards radical Islamism.

10. CASE STUDIES

So far we have aimed to give an overview of the most essential causal factors of radicalisation. Based on scholarly literature, we have assembled the most frequently mentioned factors, which have subsequently been categorised into different measurement levels and dimensions. The question arises whether the causal factors distinguished from the literature reflect the causal factors that have been responsible for causing known radicalisation processes. Perhaps, theoretical elaborations on the dynamics and interactions with which causal factors contribute to radicalisation are not realistic representations of the actual development of radical attitudes and behaviours in people. Not only can scholars have overseen important factors, the reverse can also be true: perhaps factors
that scholars presume to be distinctively important contributors to radicalisation might, in fact, have only little effect on the formation of radical ideologies in people.

To obtain first insight into the value of the theories described above, five well-documented cases of European radical Islamists are selected and compared to see whether prominent causal factors emerge. That is, we do not aim to determine which factors have played a substantial role in initiating and driving the radicalisation of these individuals. Rather, we highlight causal factors that appear to have manifested themselves in the individual’s life during the time of radicalisation. For example, the discovery that people have been involved in radical networks during the time of radicalisation can provide an indication that peer pressure played a role in the radicalisation process. The extent to which, and how exactly these mechanisms contributed to the radicalisation process, however, often remains unclear and subject of speculation.

The five selected cases, which have been selected not only because of their well-known status but also because they originated in either The Netherlands or Britain, which in Part II of this deliverable are subject to our analysis of EU member states counter radicalisation and counter terrorism policies, are the following: (1) Mohammed Bouyeri, presumed leader of the Dutch Hofstad Group, (2) Samir Azzouz, another alleged member of the Hofstad Group who was, however, never prosecuted for membership of this particular group, (3) Mohammed Sidique Khan, alleged ring leader of the first London 2005 bombings, (4) his companion Sehehzad Tanweer, and (5) Reichard Reid, also known as the 'shoe bomber'.

Essentially, these case studies do not function as empirical tests of our theoretical model. Rather, they function as a framework with which we attempt to locate the most visible similarities and discrepancies between the different cases of radicalisation. Hence, they serve only as preliminary examples of the causes and catalysts that could play a role in radicalisation processes, and of how a combination of causal factors can lead to radicalisation.

For a variety of reasons, these cases appear to be particularly interesting and suitable for close examination. First and foremost, although only two of them succeeded in doing so, all five radicals seemed motivated to sacrifice their lives for the jihad, an observation we feel legitimises the assumption that they had

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13 Other European terror-cases could of course have been chosen. For an overview of some of the cases, see (Bakker 2006; Taarnby 2005, 2006)
radicalised to the fullest extent. Second, although detailed information is rare the media have elaborated extensively on these cases, bringing forth sufficient information on which to extract some of the causal factors that seem to have been present during radicalisation. Third, the radicals involved are all home-grown in the sense that they resided and are believed to have radicalised in Europe.

Based on available documentation, mostly newspapers and court documentation, we discuss the most visible causal factors that emerge from the literature and attempt to provide a first illustration of how the underlying causal factors can initiate and contribute to radicalisation.

10.1. Mohammed Bouyeri

Mohammed Bouyeri (1978), alleged leader of the Hofstad Group and murderer of Dutch writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, was born and raised in Amsterdam. He was an eager and successful student in secondary school (Benschop, 2004) and easily advanced on to studying at college. Friends described him as a shy and intelligent man who could, although he was generally quite calm, be easily upset (Alberts, Chorus, Derix & Olgun, 2005).

Political influences appear to have played a role in Bouyeri’s life during the time when he was radicalising. In a threat letter, which he stabbed with a knife to Van Gogh’s body, Bouyeri expresses anger and disgust against Western societies and their government’s foreign policies. He calls the Dutch liberal party VVD “thaghoet”, which is the common Arab denotation for perceived anti-Islamic political parties and accused Ayaan Hirsi Ali, then a member of parliament for the VVD, of terrorising Islam (Jansen, 2005).

In addition there are other causal factors that were present at the time and that might have contributed to Bouyeri’s process of radicalisation. For example, relative deprivation might have played a role. Essentially, it should be noted that people differ in the extent to which they respond emotionally and physically to relative deprivation. Despite Gurr’s prediction that relative deprivation triggers feelings of frustration that subsequently increase the likelihood of rebellious behaviour (Gurr, 1970), the mere presence of relative deprivation does not inevitably trigger aggression or radicalisation in everybody.
Although Bouyeri was relatively well educated himself, his parents had lived in relatively poor conditions in Morocco and after moving to the Netherlands resided in a low-income immigrant neighborhood. Although Bouyeri himself started several studies, he never finished any of them until finally, after five years, he dropped out of college altogether (Vermaat, 2005).

During his radicalisation process, Bouyeri’s social network appeared to have played an essential role in his life. He was embedded in a group of like-minded peers and frequently organised meetings and discussions at his home. During these meetings, Bouyeri played videos of decapitations in the Middle East and attempted to persuade his friends to participate in violent Jihad against the West (Alberts et al., 2005). As it seems, the group was strongly influenced by the Syrian Abu Khaled, a charismatic preacher who advocated an orthodox interpretation of Islam (Qutbism) (AIVD, 2004). Khaled stayed at Bouyeri’s place for a while and is often thought to be the spiritual leader of the Hofstad Group (AIVD, 2005:14).

Presumably, catalysts were present that seem to have catapulted Bouyeri’s radicalisation process. For example, a few trigger events can be distinguished that might have intensified his radical attitudes and behaviours. First and foremost, as Bouyeri proclaimed himself, the death of his mother had changed him considerably and turned him towards intensified studies of (radical) Islam (Alberts et al., 2005). Secondly, over the course of a few years he frequently encountered with the police, which resulted in a twelve-week detention sentence for drawing a knife while fighting his sister’s ex-lover. While imprisoned, his fascination with radical Islam grew. Thirdly, Bouyeri was involved in a series of conflicts with the community service where he volunteered as well as the authorities, when they turned down his plans for a new youth centre. Finally, the broadcast of Van Gogh’s film Submission, in which Koran verses are painted on the bodies of half-naked women seemed to have prompted Bouyeri to commit his atrocious crime (e.g., Benschop, 2005).

10.2. Samir Azzouz

Just like Mohammed Bouyeri, Samir Azzouz (1986) is a Dutch national of Moroccan descent who was born and raised in Amsterdam. Being grown up in an immigrant neighborhood in Amsterdam, Azzouz attended the highest attainable
level in secondary school but dropped out before graduating. Allegedly, his first encounters with radical Islam occurred at high school, prior to his leave.

Since accurate and credible academic sources of information on Azzouz’s life course are relatively scarce, his personal notes provide first-hand insights in his motivations and inspirations. In 2005, a video-testament was found in which Azzouz expresses his disgust with the conditions in which he perceived Muslims around the world to live, and declares his readiness to join the violent jihad. According to Azzouz, he recorded these kinds of videotapes as a ‘fun’ and ‘relaxing’ way to vent his frustration (Van Zanten, 2006).

In 2005, Azzouz was arrested and prosecuted on suspicion of attempting to procure heavy firearms and planning terrorist attacks in the Netherlands, a case that was codenamed “Piranha Group” (District Court of Rotterdam, 7 December 2006). Although he has not been prosecuted on charges of membership of the terrorist network the Hofstad Group, he is believed to have close ties with most of its members, including Mohammed Bouyeri (e.g., Benschop, 2005).

From his diary, it appears that Azzouz was politically very engaged at the time of writing. He explains how he searched the Internet for answers on questions about conflicts in which Muslims around the world are involved. He started reading about the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The more he read and the more confronting images he saw, the more he turned against Israel (e.g., NOVA, 2006: 4). The diary shows that he became convinced that Muslims around the world are being treated unjustly. Gradually, Azzouz came to hate President Bush, the US’s western allies, and also Arab leaders, whom he felt were selling out their countries to the West.

Like Bouyeri, Azzouz seemed to identify strongly with the Ummah and his fellow Muslims. In his personal statements, he refers explicitly to the faith of his ‘brothers’ in the Middle-East. His video testament, autobiography and statements all show feelings of frustration with the ‘oppression of Islam’, especially by the United States, Israel and their allies (NOS, 2007). In particular, he sympathised strongly with the Muslims involved in the conflicts in Chechnya. In 2003, he travelled together with a friend to Chechnya in order to participate in violent jihad. The two never reached their destination, however. Once they entered the Ukraine, they were arrested and sent back to the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, Azzouz appeared to have been embedded in a network of like-minded, radicalising youngsters. He attended the radical Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam, which was also regularly visited by Mohammed Bouyeri and other Hofstad Group members (Van den Eerenbeemt & Kranenberg, 2004). Social dynamics may have influenced him and enhanced latent or explicit radical perceptions. For instance, Azzouz stated that he copied some passages from the video testaments of the London bombers (Van Zanten, 2006), which indicates how his opinions and acts are strongly influenced by others.

Additionally, Azzouz’s radicalisation process might have been accelerated by trigger events. In his diary, he explains how seeing the famous picture of Mohammed Al-Dorrah, the young Palestinian boy who could be seen dying in the arms of his father after being caught in a cross-fire, triggered him to delve into the Palestinian question (NOVA, 2006: 4). Seeing this as well as other footage of Muslims being shot and their homes wrecked appeared to have increasingly heated his frustration. Accumulated with the presence of other causes and catalysts, such trigger events may have contributed significantly to Azzouz’s radicalisation process.

10.3. Mohammad Siddique Khan

Mohammad Siddique Khan was the oldest of the four suicide bombers that carried out the July 7, 2005 London bombings. Born in Leeds in 1974 as a son of Pakistani immigrants, Mohammad Siddique Khan was allegedly a quiet, studious boy. He is described as a vulnerable boy who sometimes was bullied at school. (House of Commons, HC 1087: 13) His parents were not overly religious. In 1996 he left to study business at Leeds Metropolitan University, where he met his future wife. They were married in October 2001 and had a daughter in May 2004. While he was a youngster Khan considered himself Western, and insisted his mainly non-Muslim friends on calling him ‘Sid’. Moreover, in his teens, Khan never showed much interest in religion and rarely went to a mosque (BBC Radio 4, 2005; Kirby, 2007).

While studying Business, Khan got involved in helping disadvantaged youngsters. After he left college, he took on a job as a school youth worker, and became clearly serious about his faith. He told associates he had turned to religion after a far from unblemished youth during which he had been involved in
fights, drinking and drugs-. However, colleagues have stated there was no suggestion of extremism in the way he talked about his religion (BBC News, 2006; Kirby, 2007).

Khan’s commitment to the London bombings appears at least to a certain extent inspired by resentment against the role of western powers in conflicts in the Muslim world, and frustration over the fact that Muslims are often victims in these conflicts. In 2005, a video emerged in which Khan declares his anger with Western governments who “continually perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world”. He goes on saying that the Muslim Ummah is at war, and he is a soldier, like “thousands like me who have forsaken everything for what we believe” (BBC News, 2005; Kirby, 2007). Khan was not the only Muslim who felt that the West is ‘at war’ with Islam. As noted earlier, a substantial proportion of British Muslims reported believing that the ‘war on terror’ is in fact a war on Islam (BBC News, 2003). For Muslims who feel alienated and who resent western policies, Islam can become a framework to reject Western societies (Khosrokhavar, 2005). Frustration and resentment might motivate Muslims to delve in-depth into radical interpretations of Islam that can, in turn, serve as a legitimisation for radicalisation and radical behaviour.

Additional causal factors that appear to have played a role during Khan’s radicalisation process include relative deprivation and network dynamics. Khan was brought up under relatively poor circumstances; his parents lived in a low-income immigrant neighbourhood. Even after he moved, being a youth worker kept him in close contact with deprived youngsters from immigrant families in Leeds, who looked up to him and called him their ‘buddy’ (McGrory, Evans & Kennedy, 2005; Kirby, 2007). Further, Khan spent much of his time at his workplace, the Hamara Youth Access Point (HYAP), with other young Muslim men discussing religion and politics. Also, the local Iqra Islamic bookshop and the so-called “Al-Qaeda gym”, a local boxing gym in Beeston which drew radicals, seem to have been popular hangouts. The four all attended the Omar ‘Stratford Street’ Mosque in Leeds, and Khan and Tanweer are reported to have had spent time at the Finsbury Park Mosque. Again, social networks seem to have played a large role in Khan’s life during the time of his shift of thinking towards fundamentalism. Not only did these contacts reinforce his own attitudes, he is also believed to have recruited others for jihad. As a lot of the youngsters at the
club looked up to their ‘mentor’, Khan could fairly easily influence their ideas and thoughts (Kirby, 2007).

Khan is alleged to have travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he is believed to have attended a military training camp. The video that was released in 2005 was allegedly recorded during one of these trips. Although it is unsure how these trips affected him, they might have functioned as catalysts that accelerated and intensified his process of radicalisation. For instance, he might have encountered acquaintances who inspired him to carry out a violent jihadi attack in Britain (The Stationary Office London, 2006). Given the relatively short period between Khan’s last trip to Pakistan in 2004 and the July 7th attack, the trips are believed to have solidified Khan’s commitment to jihad, providing him with advice and experience, and are therefore often believed to have triggered this London bomber to carry out his attack (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; The Stationary Office London, 2006).

10.4. Shehzad Tanweer

Shehzad Tanweer was one of the four men who blew up themselves in the July 7 2005 London Bombings. Born in 1982, Tanweer grew up in Leeds in a family from Pakistani descent. His father was respected locally as a prominent businessman, making the Tanweer family a relatively prosperous family (Kirby, 2007). Shehzad was a popular high school student and an outstanding sportsman whose primary passion was playing cricket (Whitlock, 2005). Tanweer is remembered as a quiet, sporty young man who seemed to take little interest in the news or political issues. Although he was religious, Tanweer had a lot of non-religious, white friends and was considered well-integrated. Being calm and humble, people did not regard him as a religious fanatic (Kirby, 2007).

As did Mohammad Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer recorded a video statement late 2004, when the two were on a trip to Pakistan. His statement was released by Al-Jazeera shortly after Khan’s video statement was broadcast. Like Khan, Tanweer expresses his resentment against the foreign policies of western governments. The video included statements by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Tanweer stating that “what you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and become stronger until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq ... and until you stop your financial
and military support to America and Israel”. Tanweer argued that the non-
Muslims of Britain deserve such attacks because they voted for a government
that “continues to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters in
Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya” (BBC News, 2006; Fresco, McGrory
& Norfolk, 2006).

As with the other cases, network dynamics seem to have played a definite
role in Tanweer’s life during radicalisation. Tanweer frequently attended several
mosques, among which the Umar ‘Stratford Street’ Mosque, where he met the
other London bombers. Moreover, he frequently visited the Iqra Islamic
bookshop, the so-called “Al-Qaeda gym” as well as the Hamara Youth Access
Point (HYAP), the drop-in centre for teens which was allegedly used for
recruitment by Mohammad Siddique Khan, and where politics and religion were
discussed extensively (Laville, Gillan & Dilpazier, 2005; Kirby, 2007). In
accordance with Sageman’s observations, it seems that the consolidation of the
London bombers’ indoctrination occurred once they came together as a group
(Sageman, 2004; Kirby, 2007).

Additionally, Tanweer’s participation in the Islamic pilgrimage or Hajj in
2004 seems to have accelerated his radicalisation process. After returning from
the Hajj, Tanweer travelled to Pakistan where Mohammad Siddique Khan joined
him. It is unclear with whom the two men met in Pakistan, but intelligence
services believe Khan and Tanweer encountered several Al-Qaeda figures, or
were at least heavily influenced by the Al-Qaeda ideology during this trip – and
therefore it is regarded as an event that might have triggered their commitment

10.5. Richard Reid

Richard Colvin Reid is a British convert currently serving a life sentence in
the United States for attempting to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes on
Reid is often described as a ‘gentle and amiable’ man. However, he is also
remembered as ‘very, very impressionable’ (BBC News, 2001) and by times
‘depressed and downhearted’ (Elliott, 2002).

Born in London as a son of a Jamaican immigrant and an English mother,
Reid had a troubled youth with a father spending much of his childhood in jail
and his parents divorcing when he was 11. Richard dropped out of school at 16 and got involved in street crime, being jailed for the first time at 17. While in prison in the 1980s, he converted to Islam. The Islam might have provided Reid with a sense of belonging and identity, as it does for many Muslim converts (Zambelis, 2006).

As with the other radicals, Reid appeared to have been resentful against Western governments for intruding on perceived Muslim territory. In an e-mail that he sent to his mother, Reid expressed his dedication to ‘defend Islam and Muslim lands’ against ‘American forces’. He further stated that he felt it his duty to carry out an attack in the ‘ongoing war between Islam and disbelief’ (US Government statement, 2002). In his e-mail, Reid expressed his solidarity with Muslims who he believed are oppressed and exploited by dominant Western forces elsewhere – a theme that is prominent in the global jihad movement (Kirby, 2007).

People differ in the degree to which they are vulnerable to social pressure, and some people are simply more prone to adapt than others. As mentioned, Reid was labelled very impressionable, which might indicate that others can have had strong influence on his radicalisation process. After leaving prison, Reid became acquainted with Habib Zacarias Moussaoui (BBC News, 2001; Sageman, 2004), a Frenchmen charged with complicity in the 9/11 attacks. Reid started visiting Finsbury Park Mosque in London, notorious for spreading radical messages (Elliott, 2002). However, it must be emphasised that the exact role of these acquaintances remains unclear and that it is unsure to which extent Reid was actually influenced by them.

From 1998, Reid frequently travelled overseas. He appears to have spent a considerable period in Pakistan, and received training in a terrorist camp in Afghanistan. There he established close ties with several Al-Qaeda officials and operatives. It is believed that Reid’s involvement in the Al-Qaeda terrorist network has played a substantial role in prompting his commitment to carry out a terrorist attack (Elliott, 2002; Ressa, 2003). Hence, the training he received in Afghanistan and the encounters with extremists abroad may have triggered Reid’s attempted attack.

10.6. Patterns from case-studies
First and foremost, it should be emphasised that the foregoing case studies are merely examples of how causal factors can manifest themselves in the lives of people who are radicalising. The aim of these case studies has not been to test the theoretical framework. Rather, they function as preliminary illustrations of which factors can play a role in the radicalisation process.

Two comments deserve further notice. First, the descriptions of the developments are far from complete. Radicalisation processes are complex and unique, as are their causes. For example, there are probably factors that have not been discussed but nevertheless have played a role in the radicalisation process of the relevant cases. Second, the fact that only five examples are included indicates that no generalisable conclusions can be drawn from these discussions. Studies including larger samples of cases should be conducted in order to gain insight into the factors that predominantly seem to play a role in radicalisation processes. The combinations of factors that cause radicalisation are abundant, diverse and unique for each individual, which implies that no radicalisation processes are the same. Naturally, the same holds for the cases discussed above. There are more differences than similarities between them and the extent to which causes or catalysts contributed to the radicalisation processes differ.

These comments notwithstanding, a few apparent similarities are worth mentioning. Firstly, it appears that although most of them were raised in low-income, immigrant neighbourhoods, neither of the radicals seemed severely deprived themselves. Some of them were well-educated, some, like Bouyeri and Reid, dropped out before graduating.

Secondly, political grievances seem to be a prominent inspiration for the majority of the cases. All of them have expressed their grievances regarding western interventions in the Islamic world. Hence, social identification mechanisms might have played a substantial role in the radicalisation processes: in each and every case, the particular individual empathised strongly with Muslims in the Middle East, whom most of them referred to as their ‘brothers’.

Thirdly, network dynamics and social processes appear to have been very important factors in the lives of all cases. Most individuals frequently attended mosques with radical Imams, were they interacted with like-minded others. Consequently, most of them seem to have been embedded in close, relatively homogeneous networks. Peer pressure, groupthink and the tendency to conform appear to have exerted substantial
influence on these individuals. Also the internet played an essential role. Samir Azzouz, for example, explained how he employed the Internet to gather information about the Israel-Palestine conflict and to chat with others whom he met online or at demonstrations. In two of the aforementioned cases – Bouyeri and Reid – the triggering effects seem to have been prison sentences and a subsequent interest in radical Islam during the time in prison. In three other cases – Khan, Tanweer and Reid – trips to Pakistan or Afghanistan and alleged participation in training camps seems to have had a clear catalytic effect on their radicalisation. In all five cases, mosques with radical imams – the Tawhid mosque in Amsterdam, the Stratford mosque in Beeston, Leeds and the Finsbury Park mosque in London – seem to have played a significant role.

The foregoing case studies indicate that in neither of the cases, one causal factor ‘dominated’ the radicalisation process. Rather, a combination of factors appears to have been a crucial determinant of the readiness for radicalisation. In addition to causes like political factors, network dynamics and social identification issues, each individual experienced trigger events that could have accelerated the process. Whether it included the death of a relative, imprisonment or confrontation with provocative footage or literature, the lethal mixture of causal factors was diverse and unique for each individual.
Part II

11. THE EU COUNTER-RADICALISATION STRATEGY

11.1. Introduction
Following the events of ‘9/11’, countering terrorism inspired by radical Islamist ideologies became a top priority for the European Union. After the terrorist attacks that struck Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, in which most of the involved perpetrators were born and raised in Europe, specific attention was directed to understanding the 'home-grown' aspect terrorism and radicalisation. Understanding why relatively well-integrated Muslims in Europe are willing to engage in terrorist violence against the countries in which they are often born and raised, is now widely considered to be of crucial value in any attempt to tackle the phenomenon.

Radicalisation of minorities can have profound consequences for European societies. Not only can it forebode terrorist activity, it can lead to polarization and inter-group conflicts. For instance, radicalisation of Muslims in the Netherlands not only led to the violent assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh and a number of violent incidents, but also resulted in heated debates about the position of Muslims in Dutch society. As the consequences of radicalisation for society can be severe, the pertinent question is: how and to what extent has the EU taken measures to counter radicalisation?

Evidently, the protection of potential targets and minimizing the impact of possible attacks are not sufficient in combating terrorism. There is wide agreement that reducing the threat of terrorism in the long run depends on preventing new recruitment and disrupting existing terrorist networks. In-depth research of why people feel attracted to radical attitudes and ideologies, and how they are subsequently recruited to engage in a violent struggle is of great importance for dealing with the terrorist threat. Hence, in order to develop counter-radicalisation measures it is important to take note of the underlying mechanisms or root causes that may lead to radicalisation.

Bearing in mind the distinction between radicalisation and terrorism, we will in the following map the measures taken to prevent radicalisation and recruitment at the EU level. Relevant policy papers are analyzed to gain a better understanding of the EU strategies to tackle this phenomenon. Building on the findings in part I we now turn
towards the relation between causes and catalysts of radicalisation and EU policies. Aiming to provide further insight into how the contributing factors of radicalisation are addressed by the EU counter-radicalisation and recruitment strategy, a model has been developed to illustrate the degree of overlap. The model highlights those elements that have been incorporated into EU policies. Finally, an assessment of specific measures to counter radicalisation in the UK and the Netherlands are used as examples of how EU Member States who are at the forefront of de-radicalisation measures are dealing with the issue at the national and local levels.

The examples of the UK and Amsterdam should not be taken as comprehensive analysis of EU Member States’ policies. Rather, the two case studies are used only insofar as they illustrate which counter-radicalisation measures have been pursued by countries that face significant challenges with radicalisation and have been affected by so-called home-grown terrorist violence. Additionally, the UK and Amsterdam were selected to further the continuance between the case studies in part I and part II in this deliverable, since the individuals profiled in part I originated either from the UK or the Netherlands.

Building on the findings in part I we illustrate how the set of radicalisation characteristics fares in comparison with the overall counter-radicalisation strategy set out by the European Commission and the decisions made by the European Council. The classification model of the causal factors of radicalisation (see figure 1 in part I) will provide a launch pad to effectively assess and evaluate the most prominent measures in the EU strategy.

However, before embarking on this discussion, we first provide an overview of the development of European counter-radicalisation and relevant counterterrorism policies.

12. EUROPEAN COUNTER-RADICALISATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES FROM THE 9-11 ATTACKS TO THE PRESENT

Preceding the 9-11 attacks, there was already a wealth of experience in the European Commission on terrorism related matters. It had already put forward a vast array of measures that were potentially useful to combat terrorism, if they
were to be ratified and adhered to by all EU member states.\textsuperscript{14} The 2001 terrorist attacks in New York functioned as the catalysts to the development of a better European counterterrorism policy by accelerating the actual ratification of existing legislation by member states and the creation of the ‘European Arrest Warrant’\textsuperscript{15} and the ‘Framework Decision Defining the Crime of Terrorism.’\textsuperscript{16} Both developments, once again, did not break with the traditional way of fighting terrorism in Europe. Emphasis was placed on extradition agreements, tackling money-laundering, drying up the sources for terrorist funding, creation of additional legislation and enhancing transport safety.\textsuperscript{18} None of the documents mentioned any reference to root causes, radicalization or recruitment, and emphasis was placed on quick impact actions. Because of the attacks and the sudden extreme feelings of societal vulnerability, governments and international organizations (such as the EU) needed to display a capability to react. In a memo from the European Commission of the 12\textsuperscript{th} of March 2002, a plan of action on combating terrorism was publicized comprising the counterterrorism measures divided into the different areas to which the commission was making effective contributions.\textsuperscript{19} None of these areas concerned root causes.\textsuperscript{20} In June 2002 a


\textsuperscript{15} The European Arrest Warrant, valid throughout the European Union has replaced extradition procedures between Member States of the enlarged Europe. Such a warrant may be issued by a national issuing judicial authority if the person whose return is sought is accused of an offence for which the maximum period of the penalty is at least a year in prison, or if he or she has been sentenced to a prison term of at least four months. A decision by the judicial authority of a member state to require the arrest and return of a person should therefore be executed as quickly and as easily as possible in the other Member States of the European Union.


\textsuperscript{16} It contains a definition of terrorist offences, defines infringements linked to terrorist acts, covers behaviours which may contribute to such acts, approximates the level of sanctions between Member States and explicitly guarantees the respect for fundamental rights.


\textsuperscript{17} Nunes de Almeida, “European Commission”, p. 38


\textsuperscript{19} Police and judicial co-operation, the diplomatic front, reconstruction of Afghanistan, humanitarian aid, air transport security, economic and financial measures and emergency preparedness.
council framework decision on combating terrorism was adopted. This framework
decision would function as the leading document for streamlining the European
counterterrorism policy. Perhaps not surprising anymore, no root cause approach
was inserted into the document.\textsuperscript{21}

The direct consequences of the 9-11 attacks in 2001 on the European
counterterrorism policy can all be said to be judicial in scope. The initial plans
that were created to shape the European counterterrorism policy from 2001
onwards were constantly revised throughout the years that followed. The
acknowledgement of the importance of root causes for radicalization and terror
cannot be distinguished in these plans. The need to critically assess the
measures was perhaps not felt due to the fact that the attacks had not targeted
Europe. This, however, would soon change.

Despite the revised European counterterrorism measures, Islamist attacks similar
in motivation to those taking place on 9-11 did occur on European soil.\textsuperscript{22}
Apparently, the existing safety and security measures were not enough to
safeguard countries from terrorist violence. Consequently, doubts rose about the
effectiveness of the European counterterrorism measures. In the aftermath of
the attacks in 2004 and 2005 on British and Spanish soil, the EU set to work to
re-evaluate their counterterrorism policy. In this environment of increased
pressure to come up with new effective and trustworthy counterterrorism
measures, radicalization would be increasingly acknowledged as a key concept
which could lead to terrorism. ‘For the first time in Europe, ‘homegrown’
terrorists – young British-born Muslim men – committed suicide attacks. Some of
the terrorists involved in the Madrid attacks in March 2005 were also seemingly
well-integrated into Spanish society and might well have been radicalized while
living in Europe.’\textsuperscript{23} From 2005 onwards, European policy would focus not only on
judicial and police cooperation, information exchange, money laundering,
financing or border controls, but also on the challenge of tackling root causes in

\textsuperscript{21} http://eur-
Consulted 8-7-2008.
\textsuperscript{22} In Madrid and London on respectively the 11\textsuperscript{th} of march 2004 and the 7\textsuperscript{th} of July 2005.
\textsuperscript{23} Dittrich, Mirjam, “Radicalization and recruitment: the EU response”, in Spence, David,
order to prevent people from radicalizing or being recruited for terrorist organizations.

The need to tailor the counterterrorism policy to the new threats was acknowledged shortly after the attacks in Madrid in March 2004. On the 25th of March 2004, the European Council adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism following the terrorist attacks in Madrid two weeks earlier. The same day, a European ‘Counterterrorism Coordinator’ (CTC) was assigned. The CTC would coordinate the work of the Council of the EU in the field of counterterrorism, maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union's disposal, closely monitor the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and ensure that the Union played an active role in the fight against terrorism. The reason for the creation of this new function was the wide array of working groups, committees and other organizations from various EU pillars that busied themselves with terrorism related issues. Whereas only two working groups were fully devoted to the fight against terrorism – The Terrorist Working Group (TWG) and the Working Party on Terrorism (WPT) - several European bodies had jurisdiction in the area of the fight against terrorism such as: the EU Joint Situation Center (Sitcen) (threat analysis), Europol (European police office), Eurojust (international judicial cooperation and coordination of investigations and proceedings) and the Counter-Terrorist Group of the Club of Berne.

The declaration adopted on March 25, 2004, mandated the preparation of a revised plan of action to combat terrorism. The revised plan of action drew on several other sources including the 2001 action plan to combat terrorism and its related roadmap, which proves that the EU counterterrorism measures had not

26 The EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD-proliferation. The SitCen also provides support to the EU High Representative, Special Representatives and other senior officials, as well as for EU crisis management operations.
changed significantly since the changes made to it in 2001. It is, therefore, not surprising that up until this moment, causal factors or root causes were not adhered to in the various updates. The Commission envisaged that this revised plan of action would be regularly updated and would serve as a roadmap for future work. The European Council declaration March 25, 2004 set out seven strategic objectives. Under objective 6 of this revised action plan – to address factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism - radicalization is, for the first time, explicitly referred to. Objective 6.1.3 and 6.2 contain explicit references to the need of addressing radicalization in order to effectively counter terrorism. Radicalization was seen as a factor that could lead a person into committing terrorist acts or being recruited into terrorist organizations. From this moment on, radicalization would be addressed in the EU plans on countering terrorism together with recruitment issues. In an EU-US declaration on combating terrorism on June 26, 2004, article 6 stated that: "...we will work together in close cooperation to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit to their advantage." A communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks, dated the 20th of October 2004, states that "...opposing violent radicalization within our societies and disrupting the conditions facilitating the recruitment of terrorists must be fundamental

28 EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism – Update. (1) to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism, (2) to reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources, (3) to maximise the capacity within EU bodies and member states to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks, (4) to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control, (5) to enhance the capability of the European Union and of member states to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack, (6) to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism and (7) to target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced.

29 Conduct more detailed studies, including academic studies, of recruitment to terrorism in specific contexts such as in prisons, in schools, in universities or in mosques; studies in to the role of the media, including the internet, in radicalization or in promoting support or sympathy for terrorists; an exploration of links with work in complementary areas such as work on promoting cohesive communities or on the integration of minorities, including any such work being undertaken by first pillar EU Working groups.

30 Continue to investigate the links between extreme religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism, building on work already undertaken in this area, and identify appropriate response measures.


priorities in a strategy to prevent terrorism” and that their work “…will aim (…) to identify where European policies and instruments can play a preventive role against violent radicalization.”\textsuperscript{33}

Subsequent communications and action-plan-updates continued to address radicalization and related recruitment issues. On May 10, 2005, the European counterterrorism policy underwent another severe re-tailoring when the Commission agreed to a ‘Five Year Roadmap for Freedom, Justice and Security’, which is also called ‘the Hague Programme’.\textsuperscript{34}

The Hague Programme identified ten key areas for priority action. The second key area was the fight against terrorism. Other main areas were, among others, migration management, common asylum area and integration policy.\textsuperscript{35}

Suddenly all these issues received attention due to the newly risen concerns about the way in which they could contribute to the emergence of terrorism in communities in Europe. The Hague Programme demonstrated the acknowledgement of the linkage between diasporas, radicalization, and terrorism.\textsuperscript{36} A Commission’s Communication addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization of September 21, 2005 proves the perceived importance of the subject. Intercultural understanding, integration policies, interfaith dialogue, more sharing of best practices and expertise on violent radicalization and reducing the emergence of a terrorism ‘breeding ground’ were some of the measures proposed by the Commission. These were not, it must be stressed, meant to be exhaustive in nature and more research was said to be needed to come to terms with this seemingly new phenomenon of violent radicalization.\textsuperscript{37}

Meanwhile, development of conventional tools for fighting terrorism continued as well. The wish to create a secure international communication network regarding terrorism still existed and initiatives to increase police and judicial cooperation were deployed.


\textsuperscript{34} Commission agrees 5 year Roadmap for Freedom Justice and Security (Brussels, 10 May 2005) IP/05/546.

\textsuperscript{35} Commission agrees 5 year Roadmap for Freedom Justice and Security (Brussels, 10 May 2005) IP/05/546.

\textsuperscript{36} Zimmerman, “Terrorism”, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{37} Terrorist recruitment: a Commission’s Communication addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization (Brussels, 21 September 2005) MEMO/05/329.
In his speech on November 24, 2005, ‘Responses to the threat of terrorism and effects on communities’, Franco Frattini, then the European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, presented his views on violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment.\(^{38}\) For the first time, a new categorization of counterterrorism measures was introduced that would constitute the backbone of the new European counterterrorism strategy as presented in the similarly titled report on November 30 that same year. The four pillars of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy would be ‘prevent’, ‘protect’, ‘pursue’, and ‘respond’. The existing measures would all be subsumed under these pillars. Furthermore, Frattini pledged for more research into the root causes of violent radicalization.\(^{39}\) It seems as if this awareness finally caught solid ground.

A ‘European Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ was presented on November 30, 2005. According to the Commission, the strategy set out their objectives to prevent terrorist recruitment, better protect potential targets, pursue and investigate members of existing networks and improve capability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.\(^{40}\) Countering the issues of recruitment and radicalization form part of the first category of the new strategy, the ‘prevent’ pillar. The objective was to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally. As will be dealt with at length later, articles 6-13 all mention radicalization as an important factor to be countered in order to prevent people from turning to violence and terrorism in order to achieve their goals. With this strategy, radicalization was inserted in the European Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

The Commission stressed that radicalization is or should be countered by national governments on a practical or Micro- and Meso level, aided by European initiatives supported by the Commission on the political or macro level. Article 8 states that

"[t]he challenge of combating radicalization and terrorist recruitment lies primarily with the Member States, at a national, regional and local level. However, EU work in this field (...) can provide an important framework to

\(^{38}\) Frattini, Franco, Responses to the threat of terrorism and effects on communities (London, 24 November 2005) SPEECH/05/718.

\(^{39}\) Frattini, Responses, p. 5.

help co-ordinate national policies; share information and determine good practice. But addressing this challenge is beyond the power of governments alone and will require the full engagement of all populations in Europe and beyond”.\footnote{41}

With this article, the EU had taken an important step to a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. The one-sided police and judicial approach was permanently joined by multifaceted and multidisciplinary approaches in the fight against terrorism. In December 2005, the Council adopted the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. Following the Commission Decision of 19th April 2006 setting up a group of experts to provide policy advice to the Commission on fighting violent radicalization, more is being done to gather information on the subject.\footnote{42}

*The Expert Group on Violent Radicalization is advising on any matter relating to violent radicalization and terrorism, is giving policy advice and identifying new research areas required into the phenomenon of violent radicalization and terrorism. It exchanges expertise with networks, institutes or other bodies of the EU, in member states, third countries and international organizations working in the same field. The Group prepares a synthesis report on the state of play of research in the field of violent radicalization.*\footnote{43}

In a speech on September 5, 2007, Frattini stated that “*the Commission continues to be fully committed to the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy*”.\footnote{44} This means that radicalization persists as a terrorism-related issue in European and national counter measures. On November 23, 2007, the Counterterrorism Coordinator not only mentioned radicalization and

\footnote{41}Article 8, *‘The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond.’* (Brussels, 30 November 2005) p. 8. Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05 REV 4


\footnote{44}Frattini, Franco, *EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Strasbourg, 5 September 2007) SPEECH/07/505.
recruitment in a note to draw the Council’s attention\textsuperscript{45}, but he also submitted an implementation report of the EU \textit{Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment}.\textsuperscript{46} In April 2008, the Council agreed a general approach on a revised \textit{Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism}, the aim of which was to encompass three new crimes in EU legislation: public provocation to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism.\textsuperscript{47} As recruitment is increasingly seen as a crucial issue in the fight against terrorism, the evidence of which is shown in the creation of additional legislation concerning the issue, radicalization will only be rising in importance and will therefore not disappear from the European counterterrorism agenda.

Summing up, it can be concluded that it took a while for a European counterterrorism policy that implemented radicalization and root causes to materialize. Even though there was an abundance of knowledge on terrorism in Europe that resulted from the extensive experience the continent has with terrorism on its own soil, the hard approach prevailed during the better half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Only recently, under the four pillars of the most recently developed European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the countering of causal factors or root causes re-found a solid base and countering radicalization came to the foreground.

\section{13. RADICALISATION AND EU POLICIES}

Having described the emergence of a EU policy on counter-terrorism which involved radicalisation and a root cause approach, we now will take a closer look at the aims outlined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy under the strand of \textit{prevent}, and the policies set out in the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy} – \textit{Discussion Paper} (Brussels, 23 November 2007) 15448/07
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment – Implementation report} (Brussels, 23 November 2007) 15443/07
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism} (Brussels, 26 May 2008) 9416/1/08 REV 1
13.1. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Countering radicalisation and recruitment falls under the prevent strand, whose main goal is to ‘prevent people from turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally’ (EC, 2005). According to the Commission, it is paramount to ‘prevent people from turning to terrorism and to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging’. Therefore, the EU is committed to ‘identify and counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism’, and to spot and disrupt radical behaviour (EC, 2005). Being aware that globalization and the openness and civil liberties in the EU enable radical groups to put their ideas into action, the Commission considers the existence of propagation of extremist worldviews to be the core of the issue. To address these issues, the Commission aims to ensure that ‘voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism by engaging with civil society and faiths groups that reject the ideas put forward by terrorists and extremists that incite violence’ (EC, 2005).

Further, the EU pays special attention to the way its own message comes across, in order to change the perception of national and European policies and ensure that its own policies do not exacerbate division. Moreover, the EU is aware that certain conditions in society may create an environment in which individuals can become more easily radicalized. To counter this and to ensure the long-term integration of minority groups, the EU is committed to ‘promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, and engage in conflict resolution’ (EC, 2005). It also aims to ‘target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration where appropriate’ (EC, 2005).

Finally, the EU perceives radicalisation and recruitment as an international phenomenon, where much of the terrorist threat has roots in parts of the world beyond the EU. Therefore, the EU finds co-operation with and the provision of assistance to priority third countries – including in North-Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia – to be vital. According to the EU, an ‘international dialogue and alliance between cultures, faiths and civilizations’, is crucial ‘in order to address the motivational and structural factors underpinning radicalisation’ (EC, 2005).
In order to counter the issues of radicalisation and recruitment efficiently, the Commission has listed a set of key priorities under the strand \textit{prevent}. These include:

- Develop common approaches to spot and tackle problem behaviour, in particular the misuse of the internet;
- Address incitement and recruitment in particular in key environments, for example prisons, places of religious training or worship, notably by implementing legislation making these behaviours offences;
- Develop a media and communication strategy to explain better EU policies;
- Promote good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through Community and Member State assistance programs;
- Develop inter-cultural dialogue within and outside the Union;
- Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues;
- Continue research, share analysis and experiences in order to further our understanding of the issues and develop policy responses.

\textbf{13.2. The European Union Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism}

The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism builds forth on the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The combating recruitment strategy was particularly designed to curb the threat of violent radicalisation, by preventing ‘individuals from turning to violence, while halting the emergence of the next generation of terrorists’ (EC, 2005).

The Commission starts out with a few premises. Firstly, although the EU has witnessed several types of terrorism in its history, this strategy is aimed at terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda and the groups it inspires, as this kind of terrorism presently poses the main threat to the EU. Further, the EU emphasizes that the ‘vast majority of Europeans, irrespective of belief, do not accept extremist ideology, and that amongst the small number that do, only a few turn to terrorism’ (EC, 2005). Regarding Muslim communities in Europe, the EU stresses that ‘the overwhelming majority of people espouse the values of peace
and tolerance’ (EC, 2005). Lastly, although the strategy includes practical steps to address radicalisation and recruitment, the EU admits it is ‘continuing to increase its understanding of the issues’ in order to develop an appropriate response (EC, 2005).

In identifying and countering ‘the ways, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism and consider it a legitimate course of action’ (EC, 2005), the EU has formulated three main goals.

First, it aims to ‘disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism’ (EC, 2005). The main premise here is that individuals must take practical steps to become involved in terrorism. Therefore, the EU ‘works’ to spot suspicious behaviour, for instance by monitoring the Internet and travel to conflict zones. Subsequently, the EU aims to disrupt this behaviour, by ‘limiting the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation’ (EC, 2005), including in prisons, places of religious training and worship, and the Internet. The EU also strives to prevent individuals from gaining access to terrorist training, for instance by monitoring travel to conflict zones.48 Finally, the EU works towards a ‘right legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimizing violence’ (EC, 2005).

The second aim is to ensure that ‘voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism’ (EC, 2005). As previously stated in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the EU considers extremist propaganda to be crucial, especially propaganda which depicts international conflicts as proof of the clash between the West and Islam. The Commission is committed to counter propagation that ‘claims to give individuals both an explanation for grievances and an outlet for their anger’ (EC, 2005). In order to do so, the EU aims to empower moderate Islamic voices, for instance through cooperation with Muslim organizations and faith groups and the encouragement of the emergence of European imams. Further, the EU aims to ‘coordinate and enhance our efforts to change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly among Muslim communities, and to correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims’ (EC, 2005). The Commission seeks to avoid the linkage between Islam

48 Pagina: 62
This measure is off course more directed towards terrorism rather than towards the processes radicalisation, since if someone goes to a training camp, he or she can be considered as being already radicalised.
and terrorism at all times, for instance by developing a non-emotive lexicon for
discussing sensitive issues.

Thirdly, the EU aims to ‘promote yet more vigorously security, justice,
democracy and opportunity for all’ (EC, 2005). This goal, previously mentioned in
the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, is designed to respond to conditions in society
that might create an environment for radicalism. According to the EU, these
conditions include a lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved
international and domestic strife, and inadequate and inappropriate education or
cultural opportunities for young people, among others. The Commission adds
that these conditions may be particularly present in immigrant communities. To
address these issues, the EU aims to target ‘inequalities and discrimination
where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue, debate, and where
appropriate, long-term integration’ internally. Outside Europe, the EU works to
‘promote good governance, human rights, democracy, as well as education and
economic prosperity’, as well as conflict resolution (EC, 2005).

14. **ASSESSING EU COUNTER-RADICALISATION POLICIES**

Having provided insight in the findings and conclusions about the causal factors
of radicalisation in part I, as well as measures outlined in the EU policy papers
that address the issues of radicalisation and recruitment, we now turn to a
discussion of the dominant overlapping elements between the two. We will also
shed light on elements from part I that are not present in the relevant EU
strategies. In order to do so, we have made a distinction between elements from
part I that have significant overlap – those that have indeed been incorporated
into EU policies – elements that overlap to a certain extent and elements from
part I that are not mentioned in the EU strategies.

14.1. **Model for classification**

To further understand the interaction between causes and catalysts of
radicalisation (findings in part I) and relevant measures set out in EU policies, a
visual depiction is presented in Figure 3. The simple model is developed to
assess this relationship. The top horizontal row of the matrix defines the causes
and catalysts derived from part I, divided into the three measurement levels for radicalisation (external, social, and individual). The vertical column to the left indicates to what extent the causes are addressed by EU policies. The degree of overlap is subdivided into three categories: *high* (overlapping elements), *medium* (semi-overlapping elements) or *low* (missing elements).

Fig. 3: Classification of the relation between causes and catalysts of radicalisation and relevant EU policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of overlap</th>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Catalysts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Political causes; Cultural causes; Network dynamics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>Economic causes</td>
<td>Social identification; Relative deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological characteristics; Personal experiences; Rationality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14.2. Overlapping elements

By *overlapping elements*, we mean the causes and catalysts for radicalisation derived from part I, that are directly addressed by the two relevant EU documents.

14.2.1. Political causes

At the external level, it is argued in part I that political climates, and the opportunities and constraints a political system creates, affect the emergence of radicalism. For Muslim communities in Europe, poor political integration is frequently mentioned as a prominent cause for radicalisation. Research has shown that Muslims often feel underrepresented in the political system and of no
priority to policy makers (EUCM, 2006). Moreover, international political positions, in particular the diplomatic position of Western governments in Middle Eastern conflicts, have been linked to increased Muslim radicalism.

The EU shares these concerns about poor political integration in relation to the susceptibility to radicalize. It describes a ‘lack of political prospects’ as one of the conditions that might contribute to the emergence of radicalism, and strives to ‘target inequalities where they exist’ (EC, 2005). Further, the EU underlines the international dimension of the radicalisation threat, by stating that the ‘terrorist threat affects and has roots in many parts of the world beyond the EU’. It is committed to promote ‘conflict resolution, good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic prosperity’ across its borders, in order to address the motivational factors underpinning radicalisation, and also to change negative perceptions of European foreign policy – especially among Muslim communities (EC, 2005).

14.2.2. Cultural causes

Research has shown that Muslims in Europe are frequently confronted with discrimination and stigmatization of their religion. Furthermore, European Muslims experience various levels of marginalization in employment, education and housing, as well as negative stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes (EUCM, 2006). According to part I, such issues at the external level pose considerable threats to Muslim integration, and have the potential to fuel conflicts within European Muslim communities, that both can contribute to radicalisation processes.

The EU considers the above mentioned issues to be ‘structural factors supporting radicalisation’, and commits itself on eliminating ‘inequalities and discrimination where they exist’ (EC, 2005). The EU speaks of enhancing its efforts to ‘correct unfair and inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims’, as well as developing a non-emotive lexicon to discuss sensitive issues. Further, the EU considers ‘inadequate and inappropriate education of cultural opportunities for young people’ as a contributor to environments in which people radicalize, and strives to overcome these inequalities. Regarding influential radical

49 Discussing discrimination and stigmatization of Muslims in Europe under the label of “cultural causes” does not imply that we regard this as something which can be considered a European cultural trait. This discussion is merely placed under “cultural causes” as a matter of definition.
movements within Islam, the EU aims to ensure that ‘voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism’, mainly by engaging with civil society and Muslim faith groups that reject the radical ideas put forward by extremists (EC, 2005).

14.2.3. Network Dynamics

According to part I, at the social level, networks influence people’s tendencies to radicalize, while people usually invest in relationships with individuals who share their opinions and beliefs. Radicals of the same network are often very homogenous with respect to their attitudes and behaviour. Places where the radicalizing effect of network dynamics is particularly present include 1) the Internet, where existing virtual communities are connected through shared attitudes and ideology, and 2) prisons, where the feeling of being collectively marginalized creates an environment where the attitudes and actions of influential co-inmates are easily adopted. 3) Also places of religious worship or training were among the places of social networks, which under certain circumstances had a radicalising effect – in all five case studies, places of religious worship or training played a significant role in the radicalisation process.

The European Commission is aware of the radicalizing effect certain networks can have. Spotting radical behaviour and subsequently disrupting the activities of the networks and individuals that carry out radical and violent messages is one of its main goals. The EU also recognizes the Internet and prisons, as well as places of religious training or worship, as ‘key environments’, and aims to closely monitor them to detect radical behavior and recruitment activities (EC, 2005).

14.2.4. Recruitment as a catalyst

In addition to identifying the types of causes of radicalisation, part I also distinguished a set of catalysts as contributors to radicalisation across all levels. Recruitment is an important catalyst that can manifest itself at the external, social and individual level. According to the EU strategies, radicalisation and recruitment are two intermingled issues the EU aims to curb, with the ‘prevention of new recruits to terrorism’ as one of its most prominent objectives. The EU has set out a range of measures to counter recruitment, such as monitoring key
environment such as prisons, as well as putting in place a legal framework to bring individuals who employ recruitment activities to justice (EC, 2005). Thus, we can conclude that the EU is very aware of the fact that recruitment can trigger individuals with radical ideas into joining a radical group, and has put in place several measures to counter it.

14.3. Some overlapping elements

In this section, we aim to point at certain causes and catalysts from part I that are not directly addressed by EU measures, but are slightly touched upon by the strategies.

14.3.1. Economic causes

At the external level, poverty and relative deprivation are frequently cited as causes for radicalisation and terrorism. However, the existence of a causal relationship between economic hardship and the susceptibility to radicalize can be contested, for the simple reason that not every poor person becomes a radical. Studies of al-Qaeda terrorist networks suggest that Islamist militants are in fact distributed across all socio-economic classes (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006). Thus, part I suggest that other factors intervene in the relationship between economic deprivation and radicalisation, and that economic deprivation alone cannot cause radicalisation, nor violent radicalisation.

Nevertheless, the EU refers to a lack of economic prosperity as one of the conditions that create an environment in which people tend to radicalize more easily, and aims to counter this by promoting ‘even more vigorously economic prosperity’. Further, according to the EU, ‘a lack of economic prospects’ is one out of a range of conditions that can make a radical message more appealing to certain groups (EC, 2005). Thus, although part I argued that economic hardship does not directly cause radicalisation the EU does consider it to be a contributor that must be dealt with.

14.3.2. Social identification

One of the most prominent factors at the social level, and according to part I the most intervening, is identification with social groups. To a large extent, how
we behave depends on who we identify with. Therefore, social identification is a particularly accurate predictor of behaviour, and thus the susceptibility to radicalize. Identity crises and the feeling that the group is threatened, both strengthen an individual’s identification with and adherence to a social group.

The EU is committed to ‘identify and counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism’ (EC, 2005). One of its most prominent objectives is to prevent people from turning to radical groups. For instance, the EU aims to detect and counter propaganda that holds an extremist and violent message. Further, the EU aims to address the issue by making sure that moderate Islamic voices, including faith groups and civil society organizations, prevail over radical ones that incite violence. The EU also urges these voices to overtly reject radical views and to condemn terrorism. In sum, the EU aims to prevent individuals from starting to feel attracted to radical groups by countering radical propaganda and engaging with moderate Islamic voices. The concerted focus of the EU, however, is at the individual level. The EU strategy highlights the importance of understanding social identification only marginally as part of a larger effort to promote security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all. As such, this cause is considered to have semi-overlapping elements.

14.3.3. Relative deprivation

Numerous studies have been conducted with the hypothesis that relative deprivation can cause violent, collective action, even when people are not personally deprived but act on behalf of a group. Scholars agree that a discrepancy between what people believe they deserve, based on a comparison with relevant others, and what they expect to obtain, can bring about frustration and violent action. Furthermore, people can feel deprived in relation to their own expectations, in case of a discrepancy between people’s personal expectations and reality. According to part I, the concept of relative deprivation can provide us with a clarification of the fact that many radicals do not stem from poor socio-economic strata. Also, it can explain why young, relatively well-off Muslims living in Europe sometimes radicalize.

The EU strategies do not account for feelings of relative deprivation as an incentive for people to turn to radical and sometimes violent networks. No
mention is made of measures aimed to counter relative deprivation being a cause for radicalisation. However, the strategies do list a range of conditions in society that may create an environment in which people can more easily be radicalized. The Commission continues by stating that these factors do not necessarily lead to radicalisation, but ‘may make the radical message more appealing both to those who suffer them and those who identify with their suffering’ (EU, 2005). Thus, although the EU refers to people that radicalize because they identify with the suffering of others, the concept of relative deprivation as a reason for radicalisation and violent action is not further illustrated in the EU strategies.

14.3.4. Trigger events as a catalyst

In part I trigger events was distinguished as a prominent catalyst to radicalism.

Like recruitment, trigger events are incapable of initiating radicalisation, but can abruptly intensify radicalisation processes, as these events mainly prompt emotional responses from individuals that have already radicalized or are in the processes of radicalizing. Examples of trigger events are events that call for revenge or action, such as police brutality, contested elections, but also provoking speeches by public figures.

In neither of the EU policy papers that account for tackling radicalisation and recruitment, trigger events are mentioned directly as being a crucial factor in the sudden occurrence of violent action, or as catalysts for radicalisation. However, the EU does stress its responsibility to ‘identify and counter the ways, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into [radicalism and] terrorism and consider it a legitimate course of action’ (EU, 2005). Thus, we can conclude that although the EU has not set out a policy to directly address trigger events, it does address issues that might lead to trigger events. For instance, the EU strives to develop a non-emotive lexicon to discuss certain topics, which might prevent government officials and public figures from making provoking statements about Muslims and Islam.

14.4. Missing elements
The following section discusses causes of radicalisation are not mentioned in the EU strategies. Hence, these causes are not addressed by EU counter-radicalisation measures and are classified as *missing elements*.

14.4.1. Psychological characteristics

At the individual level, psychological characteristics presumably influence an individual’s susceptibility to radicalize. However, as previously mentioned, radicals do not fit a specific psychological profile, nor can they be deemed as insane psychopaths. According to part I, thus far no research has confirmed that radicals match specific descriptions – such as aggressive, depressed or identity seeking. However, it is also argued that individual contributors have the most direct relationship with individual behaviour, and therefore are particularly important in radicalisation processes.

The EU agrees that ‘the decision to become involved in terrorism varies from one individual to another, even though the motives behind such a decision are often similar’ (EC, 2005). But the documents do not elaborate on policies that are aimed at influencing psychological variables that may contribute to radicalisation, which is of course very difficult. Nonetheless, the EU could invest more in increasing knowledge about the influence of psychological characteristics on radicalisation, and raise the general awareness of this important factor.

14.4.2. Personal experiences

The choices and decisions people make are to a large extent based on their personal experiences. Therefore, at the individual level, these experiences influence how people respond to their social and external environment. It seems that major life events, such as a traumatizing and abusive childhood, can lead to radicalisation.

Although the EU does highlight the central role individual motives play in radicalisation processes, personal backgrounds and experiences as prominent causes are not discussed in either of the strategies concerning radicalisation.

14.4.3. Rationality
Individuals radicalize for different reasons, of which some are more conscious than others. Examples of intentions why people join a radical group include adventurous reasons, obtaining a specific identity, or ideological motivations. Therefore, the question arises whether radicalism is a product of rational choice. In part I it is argued that radicalisation is usually a gradual process, and thus a state of mind, rather than a tool that is employed to achieve a goal (like terrorism).

In its strategies, the EU indicates that an individual must take ‘practical steps’ to become involved in terrorism, and that ‘the decision to become involved in terrorism is an individual one’ (2005). However, despite the emphasis that is laid on the role of the individual in radicalisation and terrorism, no mention is made of rational choice being a reason for radicalism in the strategies.

15. CASE STUDIES: UK AND AMSTERDAM

This section examines the measures taken by the national government of the UK and local authorities of Amsterdam to counter radicalisation. Drawing on the factors of radicalisation established in part I and the efforts taken at the EU level, the case studies are intended to further understanding of practical experiences in countering radicalisation by two EU Member States, who are at the forefront of counter radicalisation processes. The selection of cases is based in part on the identified cases of European radical Islamists in part I. Since the individuals profiled in that report originated from the UK and the Netherlands, further exploration of the measures in these countries was needed to understand what is being done at the national and local levels. The decision to cross examine efforts at the national and local level stemmed from the fact that neither country has a comprehensive counter-radicalisation strategy. As such, the policy papers produced at the EU level serve as guides for Member State implementation. Furthermore, Amsterdam is used as an example of a large city that has adequate resources to undertake the issue at hand on a local level.

15.1. The UK approach

As part of their counterterrorism efforts, the UK has intensively focused on relations with the Muslim community. Realizing the need to reach out to
moderate Muslims in order to counter extremism and diminish support for terrorists, the Home Office strives to achieve its strategic objectives by working closely with partners both at the national and international levels. Part of a grand long-term strategy to protect the public, counter terrorism and counter radicalisation efforts are of great priority. The 2008-11 Home Office Strategy sets out goals to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks by addressing radicalisation that leads to violent extremism (Strategy: 12). As with the EU strategy of 3PR strands, preventing radicalisation is one of the four objectives in the Home Office Strategy. Focusing on the prevention of radicalisation involves a number of steps and specific measures including ‘challenging the ideology of violent extremism; addressing radicalisation in prisons; working with education institutions; and tackling the use of the internet to radicalize and groom young people’ (Strategy: 13). Before delving into the specific measures undertaken by the UK authorities and assessing how they fare in relation to the causal factors of radicalisation distinguished in part I, we consider the landscape of the UK’s Muslim communities.

Britain is home to approximately 1.6 million Muslims from a number of countries. According to national demographic statistics, over half belong to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities (The National Youth Agency, Data on the UK Muslim Community). About half of the Muslims in the UK are under 25 years of age compared with a third of the population as a whole (Home Office Memorandum, 2004)). In general the Muslim communities are among the most deprived educationally and economically. According to national statistics, 31% of young British Muslims leave school with no qualifications, compared to 15% of the total population (The National Youth Agency, Data on the UK Muslim Community). Additionally, 73% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi children are living in households below the poverty line compared with just under a third (31%) of children as a whole.

Such statistics are alarming and while some refute the hypothesis that educational and economic scarcity is the wellspring of terrorism, the findings in part I highlight that such a relationship exists in relative rather than absolute  

51 See overview of Krueger and Malečková study in part I.
terms. Social and individual factors enter the equation in considering relative deprivation as ‘the perception of being unfairly disadvantaged in relation to reference groups’, as was discussed in part I.

When it comes to religion, the Home Office Citizenship Survey found that religion and faith among Muslims ranked second after family and was particularly strong amongst young people. This is in stark contrast to Christian respondents who listed religion seventh out of a total of ten factors (Home Office Research Study, 2001:20). According to the same survey, the level of civic participation among Muslims as compared with other faith groups is particularly low. Only about 30% of Muslims reported participation in civic activities (Ibid: 42). Bearing in mind the statistics, we analyze specific measures taken by the UK authorities to curb radicalisation.

Building on the social identification factors described in part I, the following section presents the initiatives that have been developed and undertaken by Britain to counter radicalisation. These range from Muslim outreach and customized information resources for young Muslims, to participation in campus debates and sponsorship of activities for Muslim student groups. Part of a larger effort to achieve policy objectives, the UK strives to persuade young Muslims that they can be Muslim and British, and that Islam is not regarded with hostility. Based on a four fold strategy, programs of the Home Office focus on 1) intensified dialogue with Muslim communities; 2) action to help Muslim communities themselves address the main risks of radicalisation; 3) research and surveys to better understand the perceptions of Muslim communities and changes in them; and 4) ensuring that government is effectively tackling disadvantage and discrimination faced by Muslim communities (Home Office Memorandum, 2004). Concerning dialogue, substantial progress has been made in forging closer relations with the Muslim Council of Britain. Encouragement of moderate Muslim opinion is of top priority for the UK, especially when we consider that ‘developments within Islam are believed to contribute to Muslim fundamentalism’ and that ‘radicalisation of Muslims is partly the result of conflicts between moderate and radical movements within Islam’ (WP4, objective five: 16). In 2004 a letter was sent on behalf of the Muslim Council of Britain to Imams and Mosques urging them to be clear about the incompatibility of terrorism with Islam and about the need for Muslims to cooperate with the police (Home Office Memorandum, 2004).
Additional work is being done to enlist members of Parliament with large Muslim constituencies as partners in the government’s dialogue and engagement with Muslim communities and particular attention is being paid to using non-inflammatory terminology. This is consistent with the EU’s efforts to develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing sensitive issues.

Also in line with the EU’s strategy is the focus on research and experience sharing. The UK’s Community Cohesion team – a concept developed to principally reduce social exclusion – is used to further understand and gain insight into the social interaction within communities. For example, the team has set up a system for monitoring community tensions in key areas around the country. Additionally, research and survey programs help provide better insights into the causes of radicalisation and recruitment. Lastly, to tackle disadvantage and discrimination, British departments and public authorities are increasingly encouraging departments and public authorities to address faith-based inequality in their work (Home Office Memorandum, 2004).

Curbing extremism and recruitment continue to dominate the counter radicalisation agenda. Specific points of action include: 1) improving understanding of the extent and causes of extremism among young Muslims; 2) combating recruitment of young British Muslims by terrorist organizations; 3) combating Islamophobia; 4) continuing dialogue and building leadership capacity with young Muslims; 5) reaching out to underachievers; 6) responding to Muslim concerns about the use of anti-terrorism powers; and 7) promoting mainstream Islam (Home Office Memorandum, 2004). Working in concert with government and non-government agents, specific tactics are used to achieve these goals.

To improve understanding of causes of extremism, focus groups are conducted with young Muslims to explore their views on key aspects of foreign and domestic policy. Drawn from a range of educational, economic and ethnic backgrounds the focus groups also address the compatibility of being British and Muslim as well as the interpretations of Islam by Muslim youngsters. On the basis of such research, the Home Office had advocated development of a comprehensive Interventions Strategy to enable intervention at key trigger points in order to prevent young Muslims from becoming drawn into extremist and terrorist activity and action.

The use of an appropriate, non-emotive lexicon in reference to Muslim issues as well as engagement of moderate Muslims furthers the goals of assisting
and promoting mainstream Muslim communication channels and combating Islamophobia. Furthermore, expanded and deepened dialogue with young Muslims on non-traditional foreign policy areas, such as development, globalisation and human rights, help build sustained leadership capacity. Encouragement of civic participation in local and national youth parliaments is a particularly interesting tactic considering the aforementioned statistics from the Home Office Research report.

Placing the UK efforts within the context of Figure 1 in Part I, it can be assessed that countering radicalisation has been undertaken at the external and social levels. Tackling not only the types of causes, but also the catalysts of recruitment and trigger events, the UK authorities are laying the foundation for effectively dealing with the threat of radicalisation for youngsters. Encouraging positive network dynamics by promoting dialogue and moderate Muslim opinion, the UK places great importance on understanding the perceptions of Muslim communities and the changes within them.

Overall, much like the efforts at the EU level, the work of the UK demonstrates increased awareness of the radicalisation issue and proactive steps toward curbing its potentially detrimental effects. However, while the measures indeed address issues at the external and social levels, like the EU, the UK has neglected the importance of causes at the individual level. Perhaps these issues will be addressed through further research and studies.

15.2. The Amsterdam approach

The Netherlands has experienced a wave of terrorist activities in recent years perpetrated by so-called home-grown terrorists. As in most other places, countering terrorism in the Netherlands involves countering radicalisation that can lead to violent extremism. Focusing on the Dutch approach to countering radicalisation, we highlight the efforts of the city of Amsterdam. Radicalism is considered to be a broad social issue and considerable risk that poses a threat to the stability of the Amsterdam community. As such it can lead to societal unrest and increasing polarization. Analysing the Wij Amsterdammers action plan aimed at halting the emergence of Islamist radicalisation, we describe concrete actions that are being taken in the city of Amsterdam.
The Netherlands is home to one million Muslims with an estimated 24% population in Amsterdam (EUMAP.org/Muslims in EU Cities)\textsuperscript{52}. As in the UK, a large proportion of the population are concentrated in low-income neighbourhoods where the quality of housing and high levels of crime is a significant problem. Further inequalities exist in the level of education and employment within the Muslim communities. Following the rise in violent extremism and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Minister of Integration and Immigration commissioned a comprehensive inquiry into the radicalisation of young Muslims. While there are no statistics on the extent and scope of radicalisation in Amsterdam, the AIVD (Dutch Intelligence Service) has shown an increase in Islamist radicalism in 2006, concluding that radicalisation among youngsters from a migration background is continually increasing. Furthermore, as part of a study conducted by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) in September 2006, a survey showed that 2% of all Muslims are susceptible to Islamist radicalisation because they follow certain orthodox beliefs, combining it with the belief that Islam is under threat and something must be done about it. While reference is only made to one of the studies, it’s worth pointing out that two reports have been issued, the first in January 2005 and the second in February 2006.

The IMES study entitled \textit{Processes of radicalisation: why young Muslims in Amsterdam radicalize}\textsuperscript{53}, was part of the \textit{Wij Amsterdammers} program and formed the basis for ‘Amsterdam Against Radicalisation’ (‘Amsterdam tegen radicalisering’, Gemeente Amsterdam, Redactie team: PAS, IHH, en COT, November 2007). Recommendations taken from the study (2006: 9-11) include: 1) increase societal trust; 2) increase political confidence; 3) increase religious defensibility; and 4) find ways of contacting radical youngsters (2007: 22). Additionally, the report points explicitly to the necessity of assistance to Mosques in countering radicalisation and importance of increased insight into the diversity within Islam. Recommendations stemming from the IMES were translated into concrete actions by the advisor of Social Cohesion of Amsterdam. Taking a broad approach aimed at not only countering radicalism, but also removing the reasons

\textsuperscript{52} Additional facts and statistics can be found on the website - http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims. Last accessed 29 April 2008.

\textsuperscript{53} Radicaliseringsprocessen: waarom moslimjongeren in Amsterdam radicaliseren.
for radicalisation, included consideration of measures aimed at integration, participation and cohesion.

A two-pronged approach is used in Amsterdam to counter radicalisation. A hard and repressive approach is employed against ‘doers’: extremists that are suspected to have a willingness to use violence in trying to achieve their ideological goals. Recognizing the importance of working together, the city’s mayor has teamed up with the police force, judiciary, the Dutch intelligence services AIVD and NCTb. With an emphasis on actively preventing radicalisation, greater privileges have been extended to the police and security forces to disrupt individual actions. Critics argue that such an approach, based on profiling is not prudent (Amsterdam tegen radicalisering, 2007: 6 and 15).

The curative or soft power approach towards radicalisation is aimed at the ‘thinkers’: individuals that do not want to employ violent tactics (yet), but do radicalize in the sense that they are increasingly following radical ideologies. With the aim of investing into the intellectual social capital, each individual case is analyzed to ascertain what is needed to turn around the radicalisation process and is followed by suitable interventions (Wij Amsterdammers II, 2006: 22). Finally, there is the preventive approach intended to eliminate the breeding grounds for radicalisation. This includes measures aimed at increasing resistance against radical thoughts among individuals that might be sensitive to these ideas.

With an eye on the future, existing projects are constantly improved and new ones are created based on past experiences. In shaping these projects, the three target points (eliminating breeding grounds for radicalisation, increasing defensibility and de-radicalisation) are constantly kept in mind. The curative and preventive approaches in Amsterdam mainly focus on the risks and effects of radicalisation that can not be dealt with at the judicial level. The recommended approach is a strengthened and replenished version of existing projects and activities:

- More emphasis is laid on approaching target groups. Three categories are distinguished: the radical, the searcher and the environment (Amsterdam tegen radicalisering, 2007: 28).
- Also, the starting points of the strategy are sharpened: de-radicalisation; increased defensibility; eliminating breeding grounds (Amsterdam tegen radicalisering, 2007: 29).
- The approach is also strengthened by more intensive cooperation with key partners such as leading figures from the Muslim community and religious organizations in Amsterdam, which is recommended by the IMES (Amsterdam tegen radicalisering, 2007: 30).

Local level help is enlisted by delegating responsibility to several parts of the city (stadsdelen) who work on their own measures to curb radicalisation. The local government has allocated 1,33 million euro for these activities. Other financial means come from regular budgets. Activities and projects are divided into 16 subjects, which are further sub-divided into three target points. These include (Amsterdam tegen radicalisering, 2007: 31-33):

**De-radicalisation:**
- develop and employ interventions
- further developing the Sign- and Advice-points (*Meld- en Adviespunt*) and expanding its network
- countering right-wing radicalism
- training of professionals
- intensify activities aimed at education and radicalisation
- increase knowledge and knowledge exchange
- develop and employ activities in several parts of the city (stadsdelen).

**Increase of defensibility:**
- Increase the defensibility of Muslims
- Increase the defensibility of women
- Realize projects aimed at internet and radicalisation
- Realize alternative proposals from youth workers

**Eliminate breeding grounds:**
- Eliminate discrimination and intolerance
- Increase insight in diversity of Islam
- Ways of conduct with media and stereotyping
- Enhancing intercultural relations
- Enhancing social capital and political (self)confidence.
Once again looking at the endeavours of local authorities in Amsterdam in their relation to the measures taken at the EU level to counter radicalisation, it is clear that at the local level the external and social levels are addressed. Incorporating hard and soft approaches, the Amsterdam authorities have strived to strike a balance between countering radicalisation in the political, economic and cultural spheres. As is the case with the UK, however, the broad and often general policies fail to take into account the possible causes of radicalisation at the individual level, namely the psychological characteristics and personal experiences. While it is the aim of the Amsterdam approach to eliminate breeding grounds for radicalisation, the measures continue to emphasize the external and social level as the main areas in which progress can be achieved.
16. CONCLUSION

Part I aimed to provide an overview of the most important causes and catalysts of radicalisation. From this inventory it is obvious that radicalisation is a complex phenomenon with similarly complex causes. In order to understand what makes (often young and sometimes well-integrated) Muslims in Europe radicalise we need to acknowledge that none of the causal factors discussed above suffices on their own in explaining radicalisation. Rather, what we are facing is that individuals involved in violent radicalisation leading to terrorism come from a range of different social, cultural, religious, educational and professional backgrounds and enter into individual paths of radicalisation according to their specific background and personal history, who they meet at what point in time, how they interact with the group of people they most often radicalise with, etc. Furthermore, each individual is motivated by their specific combination of reasons for entering violent radicalisation and what triggers and catalysts they have been exposed to.

Even if the fact that analysing only five cases does not bode for general conclusions, there were a set of similarities among the chosen case studies, similarities, which were underpinned by the theoretical findings. Thus, the case studies indicated that in neither of the selected cases, one causal factor ‘dominated’ the radicalisation process. Rather, a specific combination of factors appeared to have been crucial determinants of the readiness for radicalisation. In addition to causes like political factors, network dynamics and social identification issues, each individual experienced trigger events that could have accelerated the process. Whether it included the death of a relative, imprisonment or confrontation with provocative footage or literature, the lethal mixture of causal factors was diverse and unique for each individual.

Thus, we suggest that radicalisation is an individual condition that is prominently caused by a combination of social and individual causal factors. In other words, dynamics in which the individual is directly involved prominently cause radicalisation, which implies that in addition to personal characteristics, the individual’s (perceived) position in relation to relevant others affect his or her behaviour.
Furthermore, we conclude that much of the debate on radicalisation has focused too strongly on finding the causes of radicalisation in externalities like political and economic conditions. Indeed, external factors like Middle Eastern conflicts and poor integration of Muslim communities in Europe appear to serve as significant inspirations for many radicalised Muslims. However, the radicalising effects of external factors should not be overestimated. Only in a complex, cross-level and cross-dimensional interaction can causal factors lead to radicalisation. We argue that external factors shape and constrain the individual’s environment but do not have a direct effect on his or her behaviour.

The complexity and uniqueness of causal factors of radicalisation signal that it is hard to define social groups that are vulnerable to radicalisation. The proportion of potentially radical individuals is so small and diverse, that it is hard if not impossible to categorise them into groups with specified social boundaries. Furthermore, research with the intention of profiling specific “ideal types” of individuals, who are more susceptible to enter into violent radicalisation, seems futile.

However, certain common traits and patterns for people who get involved in violent radicalisation are discernable. Traits and patterns, which open up the possibility of identifying counter-measures.

1) Processes of radicalisation are social processes which are inherently individual in nature and depend on the specific background, situation and personal characteristics of the person involved. The complex, multidimensional nature of the causes of radicalisation demand scientific research that investigates the underlying mechanisms that lead to individual radicalisation and radical behaviour. Under which conditions can individuals become willing to change their attitudes and behaviour to the extent that violent radicalisation is the outcome? Research should be conducted in which the individual and his or her social environment are the central focus of analysis.

2) Social identification with allegedly harmed groups is an important indicator of vulnerability to radicalisation. In particular for people for whom group membership of the relevant group is central to the individual’s self-identity, threats of the group are likely to increase radicalisation tendencies. The social factor appears to intervene in practically each and every relationship between external factors and radicalisation. For example, the degree to which people identify with a relevant social group determines the extent to which they are
affected by political, economic, and cultural circumstances. Whereas observing an Afghan Muslim in absolute deprivation is not very likely to lead to radicalisation of a non-Muslim European, a similar observation can be a very painful and provocative experience for a European Muslim who strongly identifies with Afghan Muslims. In other words: it is the perception rather than the objective situation that is relevant in the emergence of radicalisation. In order to gain further insight in the relationship between direct and indirect causes of radicalisation it is essential to map the complex interactions between causal factors at different levels and dimensions. Thus, we point to the necessity of empirical research that investigates the role that social identification plays in the emergence of radicalisation.

3) Two frequently mentioned causes of radicalisation are western foreign policies in the Middle East and the poor integration of Muslims in European societies. First, we hypothesise that the relationship between western foreign policies and radicalisation is moderated by social identification and that the stronger people identify with the relevant social group, the stronger the radicalising effect of western intervention in conflicts involving Muslims will be. Second, we hypothesise that the fact that Muslim communities are poorly integrated in European societies can lead to individual feelings of social exclusion and rejection and that in turn, these feelings can contribute to radicalisation. Thus, young second generation European nationals, who are Muslim and who can be classified as identity seeking and as high-identifiers with the perception of Muslims around the world being humiliated, who are poorly integrated and politically, socially and culturally marginalised would as individuals have a higher than normal incentive to be drawn towards radical Islamism.

Research should determine how these factors relate to other causal factors and via which mechanisms they lead to radicalisation. Scientific testing of these and similar hypotheses would probably reveal that the most important causes of radicalisation are to be found more closely to the individual and his direct environment than is often thought. If we want to thoroughly understand why a very small proportion of young, western Muslims turn to radicalism we should pay close attention to what inspires and motivates them. Not only should we listen to what grieves them, we should most prominently understand what they aspire.
4) Network dynamics (especially group dynamics) appear to play a central role in most processes of radicalisation. This is not surprising, since the process of radicalisation essentially is a process of socialisation. Some ‘network places’ deserve further interest: radical mosques and places of religious training, prisons, internet.

5) Although every terrorist is a radical, not all radicals are terrorists – or will ever become terrorists. Processes of radicalisation are individual and may evolve in many different directions, including non-violent ones. Furthermore, recruitment can only enhance the speed of already ongoing radicalisation processes, not initiate them.

6) In this study radical ideologies or radical interpretations of religion are not seen as direct causes of radicalisation. The reason for this is that people differ in the extent to which they are susceptible to or appealed by radical ideologies – only a few of those exposed to radical ideologies become radicalised. Instead, a person adhering to a radical ideology is here seen as a sign that this person has undergone a process of radicalisation. However, radical ideologies may become a driving or guiding factor for an already radicalised person, thus giving impetus to what action is acceptable and necessary and what the targets are.

7) The concept of cognitive dissonance – the psychological phenomenon which occurs when a person’s behaviour is in sharp conflict with that person’s attitudes and beliefs, which leads to psychological discomfort and further leads that person to invest more in believing what he or she is saying – may hold insights which could be valuable to describe the process whereby a person becomes more and more radicalised. Especially so, if it is combined with the concept of over-justification – which describes the situation where the more a person has ‘invested’ in a radical group, for instance by breaking with friends and family, the more that person choose to believe that membership of this group is worth it – implying that radicals become more dedicated to the cause the more links they cut to the surrounding society.

Through analysis of the most relevant EU documents, part II sought to determine the design of EU policies as they concern countering the causes of radicalisation. Based on the findings of part I and the content of the EU’s Counter Terrorism Strategy and the European Union Strategy for Combating
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, the analysis provided insight into how the contributing factors to radicalisation are addressed by the EU. Additionally, the UK and Amsterdam approaches to countering radicalisation at the national and local level illustrated the practical measures and efforts used for dealing with the phenomenon.

Going through the European Union approach to radicalisation, it can be concluded, that it took a while for a European counter terrorism policy that implemented radicalization and root causes to materialize. Even though there was an abundance of knowledge on terrorism in Europe, which resulted from the extensive experience the continent has with terrorism on its own soil, the hard approach prevailed during the better half of the 20th century. Only recently, under the four pillars of the most recently developed European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism the countering of root causes re-found a solid base and countering radicalization came to the foreground.

Looking closely at the EU policies designed to curb radicalisation, we see that the Commission focuses strongly on causal factors on the external level that might contribute to radicalisation. Less attention is paid to setting out measures that address causal factors at the social level, and almost no mention is made of tackling causes of radicalisation at the individual level in EU policy papers. Thus, we argue that causes for radicalisation that can be found in the direct environment of the individual deserve further notice when shaping EU policies.

Furthermore, the EU strategy for countering radicalisation should be considered as part of its overall counterterrorism strategy. However, after assessing the EU measures, it is clear that the Union’s efforts are aimed more at addressing external factors of radicalisation rather than dealing with the individual causes that lead people to feel attracted to radical ideologies in the first place. For instance, although disrupting radical networks is important in preventing the emergence of new recruits to terrorism, without addressing the direct causes for radicalisation new networks will continue to form. We argue that such causes can be found in social environments and individual dynamics.

Given the multilateral character of the European Union and the fact that the responsibility for countering radicalisation lies with the individual Member States, a lack of instruments might prevent the EU from effectively addressing social and individual factors that cause radicalisation. Despite difficulties in
coordination, the EU strategies nonetheless provide a valuable framework that individual Member States can use in shaping counter-radicalisation policies at the national level.

Reflecting the EU strategy of prevent, protect, pursue and respond, preventing radicalisation is one of the four objectives in the British Home Office Strategy. Focusing on the prevention of radicalisation involves a number of steps and specific measures including challenging the ideology of violent extremism, addressing radicalisation in prisons, working with education institutions, and tackling the use of the internet to radicalize and groom young people.

Thus, the UK strives to persuade young Muslims that they can be Muslim and British, and that Islam is not regarded with hostility. Furthermore, encouragement of moderate Muslim opinion is of top priority for the UK, reflecting the considerations that 1) the developments within Islam are believed to contribute to radical Islamism and 2) that radicalisation of Muslims is partly the result of conflicts between moderate and radical movements within Islam.

Overall, it can be assessed that countering radicalisation has by the UK first and foremost been undertaken at the external and social levels. Tackling not only the types of causes, but also the catalysts of recruitment and trigger events, the UK authorities are laying the foundation for effectively dealing with the threat of radicalisation for youngsters. Encouraging positive network dynamics by promoting dialogue and moderate Muslim opinion, the UK places great importance on understanding the perceptions of Muslim communities and the changes within them. On the other hand, the UK has downplayed the importance of causes at the individual level.

The Netherlands has through its *Wij Amsterdammers* approach developed a two-fold strategy to counter radicalisation. 1) A hard and repressive approach is employed against ‘doers’, that is, extremists that are suspected to have a willingness to use violence in trying to achieve their ideological goals. 2) A soft power approach aimed at the ‘thinkers’, that is, individuals that do not want to employ violent tactics (yet), but do radicalize in the sense that they are increasingly following radical ideologies. 3) A preventive approach intended to eliminate the breeding grounds for radicalisation. This includes measures aimed
at increasing resistance against radical thoughts among individuals that might be sensitive to these ideas.

As is the case with the UK, however, the broad and often general policies fail to take into account the possible causes of radicalisation at the individual level, namely the psychological characteristics and personal experiences, which, according to this deliverable, is one of the so far downplayed approaches to tackle radicalisation. While it is the aim of the Amsterdam approach to eliminate breeding grounds for radicalisation, the measures continue to emphasize the external and social level as the main areas in which progress can be achieved.
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